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Previous literature relating the occurrence of
stressful life events to the onset of depression is reviewed
together with that which discusses the range of behaviour
which people habitually deploy against such depression. The
study explored the proposition that certain personality
characteristics would influence the pattern of behaviour shown
by individuals responding to stressful situations and would
therefore determine their susceptibility to reactive
depression.
24 subjects, from each of three experimental groups
(normals, psychiatric controls and depressives) were asked to
describe their responses to a series of 6 imagined stressful
events and to the condition of feeling depressed itself. It
was hypothesised that internal subjects (as defined by the
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control scale) would deploy
more active problem-solving behaviour than externals who were
predicted to show more defensive or passive behaviour. It was
also hypothesised that the trait of internality would be
stable and predictive of susceptibility to depression.
Although the predicted relationship was observed
between locus of control beliefs and both patterns of
responding and the amount of depressed mood, it was concluded
that the external beliefs could be regarded as being
co-determined with the depressive affect, rather than
preceding and causing it. Some evidence was found for
interactions between the nature of the stressful event and the
nature of the individual, as determinants of the patterns of
responding elicited. The nature of such interactions was
discussed in the light of current theories of depression.
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as permitting both physiological and psychological repair to take
place. They include crying out, talking out the problem, laughing it
off and seeking support from others. These are listed with the other
coping responses but clearly, as with the defence reactions, their
over-use could be regarded as equally maladaptive. Other forms of
withdrawal behaviour include techniques which actually remove the
individual totally from the situation; many of these are described as
being neurotic avoidance patterns when they are used to excess. These
would include "being ill", getting drunk, doing something quite
unrelated to the job in hand, etc.
A primary characteristic of coping responses is that the
individual who deploys them is active in his situation, attempting
positively to see the situation through. Clearly, these attempts can
also be maladaptive, if the decisions made are hasty, inadequate or
rigid in form, or if the targets to which the person aspires are
unrealistic. Effective problem solving strategies may be regarded as
being of great importance in dealing with the stressful events which
the individual may experience during his life.
The study which follows examines the general hypothesis that
certain people who are prone to depression, possibly because of one of
their personality characteristics, will, when confronted with
stressful events, deploy a non-optimal selection of responses, in
terms of the balance between their coping and their defensive
behaviour. It is also hypothesised that a similar failure in strategy
will appear in their responses to the experience of depression itself.
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1.2 Anti-depressive Behaviour
Although in theory most positive coping responses could
result from trial and error learning on the part of the individual, in
practice most of his forms of coping and defensive behaviour can be
regarded as having been learned from models present in his
environment. Most of these responses, and the rules for their
deployment may be obtained through the social learning processes of
imitation learning, social shaping and vicarious reinforcement
described by theorists such as Bandura (1977). Thus, as Rippere
(1976) has pointed out, there is a "stock of social knowledge"
regarding the forms of behaviour which may be used to combat
depression. Such may be termed anti-depressive behaviour (ADB) and
would include any form of activity used by an individual to relieve
depression. She claims that ADB has "a commonplace, traditional,
culturally transmitted, rule following and adaptive character".
Rippere (1976,1977a,1977b) has reported data from a series
of investigations designed to examine the nature and extent of this
social knowledge. The technique used was that of an open-ended
interview based around the question, "What is the thing to do when you
feel depressed?" Further clarification, for those who requested it,
referred to "what common sense would tell one to do". It seems very
likely that because these guidelines seem to emphasise effective ADB
and because professional and other advice may well evaluate coping
behaviour more positively than defensive behaviour, there would be
social pressures operating in this experimental situation which would
limit the reporting of defensive or ineffective behaviour. The
subsequent analysis of these data may therefore be criticised on the
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grounds that they may be incomplete.
Rippere's (1976) study examined a) the amount of ADB which
each subject reported using and b) how helpful that behaviour was
deemed to be. Despite the bias in the instructions used to collect
the data, certain behaviours were reported as being used but also as
being ineffective. Thus watching TV was endorsed by 60% of the sample
but was considered to be unhelpful by 21%. Other ADB's reported as
being unhelpful by at least 18% were: wallow in it, read and stick to
the normal routine. Rippere therefore argues that her findings
indicate that "in addition to being widespread, ADB is also robust,
persisting in the face of failure to produce the desired result".
These studies overlook the time scale over which the
efficacy of the activity is considered. Some behaviours may have an
immediate, short-term effect (eg watching TV) but have no appreciable
long term value since they leave the basic problem untouched. The
reverse will be true for other behaviours, such as engaging in
goal-related activities, seeking advice, etc. Preference for these two
types of ADB might be expected to be a function of the type of
personality of the individuals choosing the behaviour. Since
internals (as defined by scores on the Rotter Locus of Control scale)
have a greater tolerance for delayed gratification than externals
(Phares 1976), they should tend to evaluate long-term and
problem-oriented behaviour as being better than short-term or
avoidance behaviour. The reverse may be true where the individual has
a low expectation of being able either to change his current mood or
to solve the precipitating problem, that is to say, where he has
external beliefs. Rippere (1976) did not discriminate between these
two different aspects of ADB and it may be for this reason that she
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found no differences with respect to either the number of items of ADB
found to be helpful, or the percentage of items found to be helpful by
internals as compared with external subjects.
Rippere did find that the difference in the number of ADB's
reported as being used approached statistical significance for the
variable of patient status (depressives 36.8: controls 26.3). The
percentages of ADB found to be effective also showed a non-significant
trend, but in the opposite direction (depressives 69.5%: controls
77.8%). These data are consistent with depressives having a wider
range of ADB at their disposal but either this repertoire is deficient
in effective techniques or they have a tendency to use the least
effective of the techniques.
Alternatively, the capacity to employ coping responses may
become exhausted after protracted exposure to stress, as Coleman
(1976) has suggested; "The individual tends to become rigid and to
cling to previously developed defenses rather than trying to
re-evaluate the stress situation and work out more adaptive coping
patterns.... adaptive resources are depleted and the coping
patterns... begin to fail". If this is the case, then the type of ADB
deployed and its effectiveness will clearly vary as a function of the
time scale of the depressive disorder or its depth as well as, or
instead of, being a function of the individual's personality.
It would seem reasonable to assume that if ADB were drawn
from a stock of social knowledge, there would be differences in the
nature and range of ADB employed between males and females. For
example, Hinchcliffe et al (1978), suggest that men retain
problem-oriented behaviour more than women when they are depressed.
Also, if women are encouraged, socially, to discuss their problems
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with others, they may have access to a wider social knowledge of
stress-relieving techniques than men, in whom the amount of
self-disclosure and discussion may be lower. Nevertheless, Rippere
did not find any differences in the amount of ADB claimed by men and
women. There remains the possibility that both use similar ranges of
ADB but differ with regard to the type of ADB on which they rely
most.
Rippere (1977) reported that some 15% of all responses were
subject to qualification of some kind. Thus "It depends on the reason
for the depression" was given as 15% of the total number of responses;
"It depends on how depressed one is" as 11%; and "It depends on the
type of depression" as 10%. These all suggest limitations to the
appropriateness of the ADB as a function of the situation the person
has encountered and "It depends on the individual person" suggests
limitations due to individual differences. All of these spontaneous,
commonsense notions parallel those which are the concern of studies of
interactionism in the field of individual differences (cf Bowers
1973).
There is clearly a case for replicating this kind of study
with the aim of examining the types and ranges of ADB reported by
different types of person in the absence of any instructional bias to
report the "best thing" to do. A bias towards what the subject
himself would do should more accurately elicit strategies associated
with personality traits. The use of specific stress-inducing stimuli
would extend the scope of the investigation to cover responses to
events which might precipitate depression, as well as yeilding the
possiblity of examining situation-specific response patterns.
It is relatively easy for a subject to describe what he
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should do (social knowledge) or what he has done (personal history)
but not easy, in a simple paper and pencil test, to say what he would
do in the immediate present. Only the direct observation of actual
responses to stress can answer this question. One alternative to the
observation of actual stress responses is the recording of imagined
responses to imagined stressors evoked in a manner analagous to those
images traditionally used in systematic desensitisation techniques.
This is the strategy to be employed in this study.
1 .3 Stressful Situations
Several studies have shown that major events of a stressful
nature can be identified as having occurred in the patient's life
immediately preceding the onset of depression (eg. Paykel 1974, Leff
et al 1970). The events identified in such studies include: changes
in marital relationships, changes in residence, failure in a job
performance, damage to social status and death of an important person.
In addition, Flach (1974) argues that all depressions have some form
of precipitating cause although many sufferers will not recognise it
as such, especially when it involves a deep dissatisfaction with their
styles of life.
Holmes et al (1967,1970) have reported a list of events
which place demands upon the coping capacity of any individual who
experiences them and which are seen as leading to both physiological
and psychological disturbances, including depression. Values were
attached to each of these stressful events by the process of having
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judgements made about the amount of readjustment necessary in an
individual experiencing the event. The mean value of these judgements
was computed to give the Life Change Unit (LCU) score for each. The
values quoted, on the resulting scale, range from 100 for "Death of a
Spouse" to 11 for "a minor violation of the law". This scale can
therefore be considered as a suitable starting point for the
examination of people's coping or defensive responses to stressful
life situations.
However, the values quoted in the scale are subject to all
of the criticisms normally applicable to judged data. In particular,
if the judges were orientated towards middle class values, then the
implied stress pattern which is incorporated into the final scale will
be that of the middle class. Although the sample of judges used was
mixed with respect to social class, sex, age, religion and marital
status, it was nevertheless described as being a "sample of
convenience".
Another weakness of this list is that a wide range of events
and emotional outcomes is subsumed under each item in the list and
these ranges differ between items. Thus, "Death of a Spouse" can only
mean one thing and normally only one type of stress but "Change to a
different line of work" could have many meanings, from being dismissed
to being made Chairman of the Board, with consequent differences in
emotional consequences and on the type of coping behaviour which is
required. Certain of the events listed, such as marriage, would
normally be seen as being wholly positive and yet they are also seen
as contributing to the overall level of stress. Other events, such as
a change of residence, may actually have been effected in order to
reduce stress. Also, there is no clear way in which chains of
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consequences can be handled within the simple accounting procedure
used in calculating the predictive scores obtained from the list.
Thus, divorce, rated at 75 points, may bring with it changes in
status, residence and character of interactions with family and
children, and thus lead to the accumulation of a large score from the
starting point of one stressful event, as itemised in the scale.
Conversely all of these changes might bring relief to the divorcee!
Empirical validation of the LCU list was claimed from
studies relating the incidence of psychosomatic illness to the total
value of the LCU's experienced in the preceding 12 months. People
having a score in excess of 300 for any 12 month period were shown to
have a higher rate of illness in the following year than those with
lower scores (Rahe 1968). High overall LCU scores were also related to
the presence of heart disease (Theorell and Rahe 1971) and to the
strength of psychiatric symptoms as measured by Langner's psychiatric
screening test (Dohrenwend 1973).
Dohrenwend (1973) observes that the LCU's can be
differentiated according to the locus of responsibility; the extent to
which an individual can be regarded as having control over the
occurrence of the LCU. She quotes several studies which indicate that
the effects of the LCU's are the same for those events which are
considered to be under the individual's control and those which are
not. However, the classification of locus of responsibility is also
by means of ratings of the LCU item as a whole and is subject to the
same criticisms as were the judgements of severity. In reality,
different levels of control may be involved in all of the LCU items,
depending upon the context in which they occur. Thus, "Death of a
Spouse" may be due to complete control (murder or dangerous driving),
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some control (negect or negligence), or due to wholly uncontrollable
forces (cancer). Only where a single event is specified in full can
clear decisions be taken as to the amount of control the individual
has had over it. Even then, the amount of control, in psychological
terms, may not be clear since the individual's subjective appraisal of
the extent of his responsibility will often differ from the observer's
assessment.
Whilst the LCU scale remains a satisfactory starting point
for the examination of stressful events, it can be argued from the
above that each event used should be carefully specified as to its
positive or negative value, extent of control and extent of
combination with other LCU events before it can be used to made clear
predictive hypotheses. Necessarily though, such specification reduces
the likelihood that the amount of re-adjustment that it entails is
congruent with the value assigned to the original item by Holmes et
al.
1 .4 Locus of Control and Depression
The dimension of Locus of Control, derived from Rotter's
(1954) social learning theory, has been regarded as being elated to
depression. It refers to the generalised expectancy on the part of the
individual as to the extent to which he controls the events in his
environment, particularly the obtaining of reinforcements. Rotter
defines expectancy as "the probability held by the individual that a
particular reinforcement will occur as a function of a particular
response in a particular situation or situations". His theory
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therefore emphasises the cognitive connections between response and
reinforcement outcome. Assessment of externality is typically achieved
through the Rotter Internal-External Control Scale (1966), which
samples expectancies in the contributory areas of academic,
employment, social and political activities, to provide a general
summary score. A subject scoring high in externality is seen as
having an environment over which he perceives that he has little or no
control: one in which events are controlled by chance or by "powerful
others".
A further important concept in this theory is that of
reinforcement value which Rotter defines as "the degree of preference
for any reinforcement to occur if the possibilities of their all
occurring were all equal". Thus, unless the reinforcements available
in a particular area, such as work, or political activity, have any
real value for the individual he will not exert any effort in the
area, even if he has an expectancy that he could control events
therein. It is also predicted that stress or frustration will only
occur where lack of control is perceived with respect to valued
reinforcers.
This approach shows parallels with that part of Beck's
(1976) theory which argues that depression is a consequence of
negative cognitions held by the individual regarding his world, in
that external beliefs would imply that the individual is powerless.
There are also similarities with Seligman's original theory of learned
helplessness (1974) to the extent that the latter describes ways in
which the individual may come to learn that there is no connection
between his activities and the rewards which he obtains from his
environment. Indeed, the experimental techniques used by Seligman and
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his co-workers, to induce learned helplessness are very similar to
those used by Phares (1962) to induce external expectancies. Thus
Seligman (1974) exposed his subjects (dogs) to inescapable shock and
Hiroto and Seligman (1975) reinforced human subjects at the 50% level
for their responses on an insoluble task. Phares, intending to induce
external beliefs, used a paradigm in which subjects could avoid an
electric shock by pressing the "correct" button when a nonsense
syllable was presented. The experimental group were instructed that
the button-syllable relationship varied on each trial. This group
would therefore have been experiencing very similar conditions to
those in a learned helplessness induction and did indeed show some
evidence of externalism. Clearly, both of these paradigms give a
behavioural model for the generation of what may, in cognitive terms,
be described as a perceived lack of control over reinforcements.
A number of studies have demonstrated a positive
relationship between externality and depression, although the
correlations reported have typically been relatively small. Thus
Calhoun et al (1974) found correlations of 0.58 for male and 0.38 for
females between externality and scores on the Zung depression scale.
These small correlations may be due to the multi-dimensionality of the
Rotter scale. Alternatively, they may reflect the curvilinear
relationship which was suggested by Phares (1976). He considers that
individuals at both ends of the Locus of Control Scale may be rather
inflexible in their approach to their problems. Thus, extreme
externals might show a very low tendency to exert control in all
situations and hence experience an unrewarding environment similar to
that proposed in learned helplessness. At the other end of the scale,
the extreme internal may believe that he should be able to control
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every event in his world and require more of his own performance than
is objectively possible. He may then become anxious as his
performance falls short of his target or become depressed at the size
of his task. These effects would therefore increase the probability of
maladjustment being shown by people at both ends of the scale whilst
predicting the highest level of adjustment in the people in the middle
of the scale.
From the basic propositions of Locus of Control theory, as
described by Phares (1976), it is possible to make certain predictions
about the style of responding to LCU events which would be shown by
internals as compared with externals. Internals would be expected to
attribute personal responsibility in greater measure to the events
which they have experienced. Because of their predisposition to
regard all events as opportunities to use their skills, they should
have acquired better information about the difficulties which are
involved in the events, have more appropriate pre-learned skills and
be more likely to deploy tactics which relate to long term (and
therefore higher grade) goals, than externals. In short, they should
draw the maximum value from the fund of social information available
to them regarding the handling of all forms of stress. All of these
strategies should assist the internal to reverse or at worst alleviate
the effects of a stressful LCU event. It would be predicted that
externals, favouring the chance explanation of their lives, would
employ more defensive or passive approaches to the stressful events
which they experience and for example, accept the situations as being
given and therefore irreversible. These differences in approach may
also be expected with regard to the attempts on the part of the
individual to control the effects of depression itself. Consistent
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with this proposition are the findings of Helweg (1971) and Jacobsen
(1971) that internals preferred a client-centred style of therapy
while externals preferred more structured, authoritarian regimes.
Since the phenomenon of externality runs parallel to that of
learned helplessness it might be predicted that, through the schedules
of reinforcement which they have experienced in life, externals would
have some pre-disposition towards depression. Where their coping
responses were put under pressure during a LCU event, it might be
expected that their generalised expectancy of lack of control would
lead to some degree of depression. If this were the case, then any
experimental manipulation which imposed some degree of stress upon
subjects would have more of a depressing effect on externals than on
internals. The proceedure used in the current study, although it only
asks subjects to imagine themselves in distressing events, would be
expected to show this effect.
The question of whether the external beliefs of the
individual pre-date his depressive feelings and can therefore be
regarded as a predisposing cause, or they post-date the
depression-inducing event and are co-produced simultaneously with the
depression may be illuminated if the depressive individual is studied
over a relatively long period, after recovery. Some evidence regarding
this question would be obtained by examining the stability of the
externality scores in relation to changes in the degree of depression
reported by the subject. If externality pre-dates depression it
should remain stable and independent of the depression score. If it
is co-determined it will, of course, fluctuate with levels of
depression.
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1.5 Depression and Anti-Depressive Behavior
Depression is frequently regarded as varying in depth along
a continuum from the everyday "blues" through neurotic depression,
which implies some impairment of psychological functioning, to the
more severe condition of psychotic depression where impairment is
severe. In many experimental reports and theories there is no clear
differentiation between the findings pertaining to one of the latter
categories and the other (cf Kendall 1968). However, differences have
been claimed between the two. It has been argued, for example, that
there are differences in the pre-morbid personalities of neurotic and
psychotic depressives. The pre-morbid personality of psychotic
(endogenous) depressives has been described as being more stable and
"active, intelligent and social", while that of the neurotic
depressive has been regarded as much less stable and well-adjusted
(Chodoff 1974). Neurotic depression has also been described as the
reaction to the last straw in a life of disappointments (Suinn 1975)
and as the final failure in a life of failing to cope with events
(Buss 1966). If this is the case then the external pattern of
behaviour is more likely to be observed in neurotic depressives than
in psychotics and this study therefore concerns itself with the
former, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association
classification system (1968).
Almost all of the items on the LCU scale produced by Holmes
et al (1967) could be cited as precipitating causes for depression. A
central issue is why these events cause depression in some people but
not in others. Seligman's original theory of learned helplessness, as
outlined above, implies that the depressed affect would emerge where
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the strategies of the individual fail to deal with these events, or
where they are otherwise unresolvable. A later revision of the
theory, designed to resolve certain anomalies, was made in terms of
attribution theory (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1979). In this
an important part of the individual's response to failure is the set
of attributions which he makes concerning the cause of the failure.
The sources of failure can have three main forms. Firstly, the cause
may be internal, in the sense of the person's own weaknesses or lack
of skill or, it may be external in the sense of not being,
objectively, under his control, such as the processes of death and
disease. Although this strongly resembles the concept of Locus of
Control, it is not identical with it in the sense that the latter is
seen as a relatively enduring personality characteristic which
subsumes other traits, whilst the former refers to a specific
cognitive response to a specific event. Secondly, the cause may be
regarded as stable, in the sense that it is unlikely to alter in the
future, such as the level of intelligence which the individual assumes
that he has, or it can be unstable in the sense that it has only a
temporary effect, such as having a bad cold or being drunk. Thirdly,
a cause may be deemed to be global, in the sense that it is taken as
evidence of a general lack of ability to manage things in that area or
it may be regarded as specific, in the sense of being a failure in
only one small area of life. This latter concept has parallels with
Beck's (1976) notion of overgeneralisation as a contributory factor in
negative thoughts; assuming that one failure means that one has failed
in life altogether. Depression is believed, in the amended theory, to
follow any failure but is likely to be worse where the attributions
made are internal, stable and global.
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Although these attributions are essentially subjective
appraisals of the person's experiences, the processes which are
implied within them can be used to specify the kind of LCU that the
individual is confronting. Thus, the nature of a LCU event could be
specified objectively in terms of the responsibility which the
individual has for its occurrence. Events could also be categorised
according to whether they implied failure at the global level or were
simply specific instances, and according to whether their causes were
enduring or temporary. In the case of the items to be used in this
study, the first dimension was used as a manipulated variable. The
other two dimensions were not manipulated intentionally and certainly
there was nothing to lead the subject to believe that what he was
experiencing was an enduring part of his life. A second alternative
therefore remains open, in examining people's responses to these
imagined situations, that of examining their statements for evidence
of such attributions. It is likely that the successful individual,
and possibly the internal, will tend to employ internal attributions,
only occasionally using external attributions as a short term defence
and will certainly see any failure as one which is confined in its
effect and temporary in nature.
Three main explanations for the appearance of depressed
affect in response to the LCU events may be advanced:
1 Personality-dependent causes
The coping responses of an individual who is prone to
depression may be inadequate to the task set them, in that he may
respond to the event with disordered, inadequate or avoidance
behaviour. This pattern of responding will, of course, only produce
depression if the values of the reinforcements involved in the event
18
are high for him. A lack of consistent or appropriate responding may
also emerge from a low expectation of control over such events. If
such a psychological pre-disposition towards depression does exist
then it may be expected that depressives, as a group, would
demonstrate a range of coping behaviours which is qualitatively
different from that of non-depressives. It would be expected that this
restricted range of behaviours would be applied consistently to all of
the life situations experienced by the individual, without his
discriminating between them. Such a rigidity in the response
repertoire would, of course, normally be non-adaptive.
Alternatively, the total range of behaviours reported by
depressives might not differ from that of normals but quantitative
differences would be observed in the extent to which the items from
this range were used. Amongst these responses would be included the
attributions for the cause of any failure. In this case we might
expect the successful individual to attribute a moderate amount of
responsibility to himself for the events which he experiences, rather
than over-evaluating his personal responsibility, as in some forms of
depression, or at the other extreme, denying all forms of
responsibility, as is implied in the external individual's defensive
attributions.
There is a considerable history of support for this
proposition of a psychological or physiological predisposition towards
weakness in responding to stress, from Pavlov's(1927) conception of
the "weak nervous system" through Eysenck's (1947) conceptualisation
of neuroticism, to Coleman's (1976) notion of the ability to tolerate
stress without suffering biological damage. In the current argument,
it is expected that this weakness would be associated with a tendency
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to exhibit the behavior patterns and attributional style of the
external.
2 Situation-dependent causes
The proposition here is that people are not simply subject
to depression because of their personality characteristics but that
events build up a cumulative effect, in any individual, to overwhelm
his coping capacity and thence create depression. If this is the
case, then the pattern of behaviour shown by the indvidual would vary
according to the severity of the situation experienced with, possibly,
an increasing reliance on avoidance behaviour the more stressful the
event or the more protracted the series of stressful events. It might
therefore be possible to chart the progress of a depression in terms
of the pattern of ADB which is employed at each level. If the causes
of depression were purely situational, then these patterns would be
the same for all subjects.
The support for this proposition comes from the validating
studies for the LCU scale, considered above, to the extent that
everyone with high LCU scores is prone to some kind of disorder.
3 Interactions between causes
Modern personality theory has had to accept the propositions
of those who argue from the interactionist viewpoint (cf Bowers 1973)
These propositions would suggest that the type of behaviour exhibited
by the individual, in response to stressful LCU's will be a function
of both his own personality and the nature of the situation itself.
Therefore, for example, it would be anticipated that the responses
observed, in terms of the current study, would be determined by the
severity of the event, as measured by the LCU scale, the extent to
which the individual could be regarded as having been responsible for
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the event and the personality of the individual, as measured on the
Locus of Control scale. Where the response to being depressed is
concerned similar propositions may be made: the response would be
determined by the depth of the depression, its assumed cause (if any
can be identified) and the personality of the individual.
1.6 The Hypotheses
Using the materials outlined above, suitably modified and
structured, the following hypotheses, suggested by this introduction,
will be examined in the study:
1) The type of response shown by individuals to particular
LCU events and also to the experience of depression itself will be a
function of a) their personality (external versus internal) b) the
situations involved and c) the interactions between these two, such
that each of these components will account for a significant part of
the variance observed. In particular, internals would be expected to
show more active problem-solving behaviour directed at long-term
solutions. To the extent that a) is confirmed, scores on the Locus of
Control scale should be relatively independent of changes in the level
of depressed affect observed over time.
2) If depression is marked by the progressive deterioration
of coping responses then it would be predicted that the use of
positive coping responses would fall and the use of passive avoidance
responses would increase with rising depression across all groups of
subjects. In the depressives, this process should be reversed to the
extent that they recover as a result of treatment. If externality is
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purely an attributional defence, then it would be expected to covary
with depression throughout the stages of treatment and levels of
recovery. Parallel effects would also be expected between situations,
with the proportion of coping response declining with an increase in
the stress caused by the situation.
3) Alternatively, if there are personality factors which
predispose people towards depressive reactions and if externality of
belief is one of those personality factors then the patterns of
responding to stressful situations shown by the normal externals
should be similar to those observable in the depressives as a total
group.
4) If externals are prone to depression, then exposing them
to a series of potentially stressful situations, as will be done in
this experiment, should lead to a depression of affect. If, on the
other hand, this change in mood is shown by the depressives alone,
then the effect would be consistent with the hypothesis that
depression is caused by an overloading of the coping responses, rather
than a simple personality trait, since presumably, normal controls
would not be in a state in which their coping capacities were
exhausted.
5) It is expected that in depression, rigidity of response
pattern would be confirmed to the extent that the range of behaviours
reported as being used frequently forms a small part of the total
range available to the subject.
6) Sex differences are predicted with regard to the type of
ADB and coping behaviour shown and also the range of behaviours
employed is expected to be wider in females as compared with males.
7) If external attributions form part of a defensive
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strategy, then those situations in which subjects a) have no control
or b) claim not to have control should be regarded by them as less
potentially depressing that those in which control is high. Also,
subjects should increasingly deny responsibility for the events
involved as depression increases, unless depression is partly caused




2.1 The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale
Rotter et al (1962) developed this scale to reflect people's
beliefs regarding the controlability of reinforcement outcomes and to
act as an operational definition of the dimension of externality. The
initial compound scale was intended to have separable subscales
relating to the contributory areas of academic progress, social
recognition, love and affection, dominance, socio-political events and
a general life philosophy but these subscales failed to survive the
process of item evaluation and were later abandoned. Nevertheless,
these subscales are still evident in the final scale, to some extent,
since they provided the original source for the scale items and they
are still extracted as separate factors (eg. Schneider and Parsons
1970, Mirels 1970). In this respect the scale is therefore not
unidimensional and this is accepted by Rotter (1974) and other workers
in the field (Phares 1976).
The selection of the final scale items appears to have been
rigorous, with the original set of 100 forced choice items being
reduced to 23 by item analysis, item-item correlation analysis and
through factor analysis of the intended scale. Items which were
endorsed in one direction by 85% of the standardisation sample were
rejected as were those which showed a substantial correlation with the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (1960). Finally, construct
validation was obtained, in the early days, by requiring the scale
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scores to be predictive of Tuberculosis patients' attempts to
understand and control their hospital environments (Seeman and Evans
1962).
Rotter (1966) has claimed internal consistency estimates of
0.65 to 0.79, which are lower than might normally be thought
appropriate for a single trait test, but which Rotter claims are an
inevitable consequence of the additive nature of the test. He also
reports test-retest reliabilities of 0.83 over a period of one month
and of 0.49 over a period of two months. That the test is sensitive
to changes over time is suggested by Kiehlbauch's (1968) report of
test-retest correlations for reformatory inmates over 3, 6 and 9 month
periods of 0.75, 0.39 and 0.26 respectively.
Rotter (1974) has stated that the distribution of scores
expected from the scale is normal which implies that a continuous
dimension is involved, and not a dichotomous typology. Tables of
sample norms are not readily available for the scale but Lefcourt
(1982) quotes mean values for various samples which range from 5.41 to
11.0 for American samples. These values will, of course vary
according to the area of residence, occupation and the time period in
which they were taken. In this list there is a general tendency for
female scores to be higher than those for males. In the absence of
generally agreed sample norms, the convention in most experiments is
to divide the sample into internals and externals at the sample mean,
as indeed will be done in this study.
Beyond the initial construct validation studies, Phares
(1976) has argued that the scale has been further validated by its
ability to make predictions, subsequently confirmed, concerning
aspects of behaviour which are a part of the construct of control.
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Thus, internals, as measured by the scale, have been shown to ask more
questions about task related matters (Davis and Phares 1967), to be
more ready to seek assistance for personal problems (Phares, Ritchie
and Davis 1968), to show more attentiveness in a skilled task
(Lefcourt, Lewis and Silverman 1968), to be quicker in learning the
rule governing a problem solving task (DuCette and Wolk 1973), and to
be more aware of the rules governing the institutions in which they
live (Seeman 1963). These are all, of course, aspects of control
relevant to the succesful prevention of depression in the response to
a stressful LCU event.
Apart from the multi-dimensionality which stems from the
original subscales, several investigators have extracted factors
relating to different aspects of belief concerning control. Thus
Mirels (1970) found two factors representing 'felt mastery' over the
environment and the extent to which the individual perceives himself
as having control over political institutions. This latter, political
control, factor has been observed by others (Abrahamson et al 1973,
Collins 1974). The latter author, not only verified the presence of a
general factor covering 30 out of the original 46 statements
(presented separately) but also, on using a subsequent varimax
analysis, located four relatively uncorrrelated factors which he
described as beliefs that 1 ) the world is difficult, 2) the world is
unjust, 3) the world is unpredictable and governed by luck and 4) the
world is politically unresponsive. Clearly the first three of these
are very closely involved in the negative cognitions which Beck (1976)
proposes are associated with the generation of depression, so the
possibility remains that the scale measures some aspects of depression
susceptibility within normal populations. It is therefore
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particularly relevant to this study.
2.2 The Beck Depression Inventory.
This inventory was devised by Beck et al (1961) to provide a
convenient measuring instrument which would replace the traditional
diagnostic interview. The items used were based upon the symptoms of
depression observed by Beck in the course of his psychiatric practice,
together with a number suggested by the then current literature. This
produced a list of 21 categories of self-reported attitudes, beliefs
and behaviours, for each of which 4 or 5 statements were produced.
These statements are presented in the scale in the rank order of their
severity. The subject is required to select the statement which he
feels best describes his current conditiion. A score of 1 to 3 points
is accorded to each of the categories according to the strength of the
statement selected.
The original article does not contain any validation data
for the ordering of these items according to severity. However, Beck
et al do quote correlations between the category scores and the total
scale score which are significant at p <0.001 , for all but one
category (amount of weight loss reported) for which the value was p
<0.01. A split-half reliability coefficient is quoted of 0.86 (n=
97), so the scale may be regarded as having satisfactory indications
of unidimensionality.
Test-retest reliabilities are not wholly appropriate
criteria for this test, since it emphasises the current state of the
subject rather than symptom duration. Substantial fluctuations are to
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be expected between one administration and another and the test-retest
coefficient (0.30, n = 27) obtained by Bumberry et al (1978) reflects
this.
Beck et al report concurrent validation studies using two
separate samples of psychiatric patients incorporating all diagnostic
categories. These patients were rated by psychiatrists for severity
of depression on a four point scale from none to severe and the
resultant values were correlated with scores on the inventory. The
values obtained were 0.65 (n = 226) and 0.67 (n = 183) using a point
bi-serial correlation, with the rating data being combined into two
categories (none-mild vs. moderate-severe). Bumberry et al (1978)
used a similar technique on a student population which consisted
mainly of normals and obtained a correlation of 0.79 ( n= 56). They
also computed Pearson's r by assigning values of 0 to 3 to the ratings
of depression and obtained a value of 0.77 (p<0.001). Beck et al
(1961 ) also quote data which indicate that the group means on the
inventory scores discriminated satisfactorily between the groups
designated by the psychiatrists.
Since the items in each category are presented in ascending
order of severity and all of the statements which relate to depression
can be clearly identified, the scale is clearly open to faking, either
of the socially desirable response or of the exaggeration of symptoms.
It may be for this reason that the standard deviations of Beck's data,
reported above, are quite high. However, in practice, the inventory
has obtained a fair degree of construct validation in a large number
of studies of depression; more than 100 such studies were reported by
Beck and Beck (1972). For example, when patients were retested and
re-evaluated after a period of between 2 and 5 weeks, changes in
inventory scores were associated with changes in rated depth of 28
depression in 85% of cases (n= 33) (Beck et al 1961). Such studies
have tended to encourage the general acceptance of the inventory as an
effective measuring device.
Bumberry et al (1978) quote data relating scores on the
inventory to judged extent of depression, drawn from a sample of
students which included normals. These are 3.9 (sd 4.5) for 'none'
and 14.1 (sd 6.0) for 'mild' depression. These data are more suitable
for the purposes of defining the normal scores in the current study,
than the means provided by Beck et al (1961) whose sample contained
only psychiatric patients. The upper limit of the 'normal' score on
this inventory, ie that which implies an absence of real pathological
symptoms, can therefore be regarded as 8 since one can hypothesise
from the standard deviations that only 17% of normals would show a
score above this. Those subjects scoring between 8 and 10 on this
inventory could be regarded as being marginal to their samples, since
such a score is consistent with being a low-scoring depressive or a
high-scoring normal.
2.3 The current mood Scale
To measure any changes in mood which might occur as a result
of the manipulations in the current experiment, it was necessary to
use an instrument which was both quick to use and which would minimise
the resistance to change in scores which can derive from the subject
being able to remember precisely his original response. The type of
test selected was the visual analogue scale (VAS). Aitken (1969) has
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argued that these scales are appropriate to the measurement of moods
since moods exist as continua and the analogue scale avoids forcing
the subject to report his state in a simple nominal or dichotomous
form. He also considers that "comparisons can be achieved with
greater sensitivity than with semantic phrases, particularly between
different occasions in the same person". According to Zealley and
Aitken (1969), the principle is readily comprehensible by the subject
and allows repeated measures to be taken with a minimum of
inconvenience to him and has the advantage of not asking him to review
his emotional status under numerous and possibly confusing descriptive
headings. McKelvie (1978) found that subjects preferred an unmarked
line to one of equal length divided into either 7 or 11 separate
categories.
Aitken (1969) suggests that the scores obtained from the VAS
can be regarded as being suitable for parametric statistics as well as
non-parametric since they can be reported to the nearest millimetre,
where the line is 10 cm. in length. These data are therefore suitable
for analysis of variance models.
There are difficulties in assessing the reliability of VAS
scales. Test-retest concordance is not appropriate since, when it is
assessed over very short intervals, the subject may be able to
remember the position of the mark he has made on the line. Over a
longer period, this correlation would be affected by the fluctuations
in the mood state which the scale is expected to measure. However,
McKelvie (1978) obtained test-retest reliabilities of 0.79 ( n = 20)
over a period of 2 weeks, in a group of subjects required to assess
French Canadians using adjectives to define the scales.
The validity of such scales will largely depend upon the
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face validity of the adjectives used to define them, in the sense that
these adjectives are comprehensible to the subjects. Aitken (1969)
does cite studies in which satisfactory correlations have been
obtained between self-ratings and observer's ratings of the same
phenomena; 0.71 for quality of sleep and 0.51 for the relief of
symptoms in dyspepsia. Since the scales are necessarily designed for
specific experiments and can therefore have no generally applicable
norms, some attempt will be made in the current study to validate the
VAS scales used by correlating scores on them with those obtained on
the Beck Depression Inventory.
Aitken (1969) considers that VAS's have shown sufficient
construct validity from their use in a variety of experiments and have
thus obtained widespread acceptance. The technique was therefore used
in this study, where the crucial score is the difference between the
pre- and the post- experimental mood. To indicate this, the subject
may actually remember the position where he placed the mark in the
first administration and thus be able to demonstrate whether he feels
better or worse in the post-experimental phase. Alternatively, he can
attempt to provide a wholly new rating of mood according to some
personal, internal scaling system. However, because of the relatively
short time between the two administrations, it is unfortunately the
case that the subjects could obscure any real changes in mood by
regarding it as appropriate not to show such changes and seeking to
place the second mark in exactly the same postion as the first. In
this respect, then, such changes as are observed may be regarded as
referring to 'tough' tests of the hypotheses.
In order to obtain a stable overall score, in which minor
errors of the subject's judgement might be expected to cancel out
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between the component scales, a total of seven contributory scales
were used to measure mood in the subjects before and after the
manipulations in this experiment. The first two of these were chosen
for their direct relationships with depression; happy vs. not happy
and depressed vs. not depressed. Further items were selected which
reflected aspects of depression expressed in the Beck Depression
Inventory and in the Foulds Sign-Symptom Inventory (1968). These were
energetic vs. listless, to represent the motility component of
depression; confident vs. not confident, to represent the self-esteem
component; able to do the things that I have to do vs. not able to do
the things I have to do, to represent the passivity component; can
concentrate easily vs. cannot concentrate easily; and interested in
other people and events vs. not interested in other people and events.
2.4 The Stimulus Materials
Each of the LCU events listed by Holmes et al (1967) was
examined to see if a short descriptive passage could be composed which
would describe a particular event from that category and which would
meet the following criteria:
a) Responsibility for the Event
For each passage, the likelihood that the person in the
situation would actually have caused it had to be capable of being
specified. Stories in which the participant would have been
responsible for the event occurring were designated Control (C)
stories. Where he would have had no such reponsibility they are
designated Non-control (NC) stories, in the Tables. (The stories
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which were used in the final study are listed in Appendix I.) Such
specification was necessary to cover the problem of the differential
attributions of causality to internal or external agencies, discussed
in Ch 1.
b) Universality
In each case the stories were constructed such that they
could apply, with a minimum of qualification, across the whole range
of personal and social differences such as sex, marital and
occupational status, etc. An attempt was also made to keep the
language employed simple and colloquial. Situations were avoided
which would involve specific experiences which some of the sample
might not have encountered, such as going to jail, having a loan
fore-closed and having a son or daughter leave home. Some events were
discarded because the events would have been too far in the future
(retirement) or too far in the past (changing schools) for many of the
subjects. All of the events described were potentially unpleasant and
stressful in nature, with the exception of one item designed to
provide light relief at the end of the main series of stories (LAM),
in order to dispel any unpleasant effects created in the subject by
the experiment. As far as possible, each item was designed to be
isolated in itself, and therefore not would not entail subsequent life
changes of the type also listed on the LCU scale.
c) Feasibility
Story areas were avoided where the experimenter felt that he
could not comfortably relay the story to the subject and where other
problems of experimenter-subject relationships could be predicted.
The LCU item obviously eliminated under this rubric was that of
'sexual difficulties'. Substitutions were considered for some items
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on the LCU list. Thus, in the final list of items used, the LCU event
"change in number of arguments with spouse" seemed to pose
difficulties, since it relates to trends rather than specific events.
In place of the original an item was created which referred to a
simple argument with the life partner, with an emphasis being laid
upon a 'typical row'. This item could clearly carry less of a stress
rating than indicated by the original LCU rating but it was hoped that
it would reflect the tensions and uncertainties in the subject's
relationships and hence be potentially quite strong in its effect.
Finally, in order to be able to compare subject's responses
to overtly stressful situations with those deployed against depression
itself, an item was included which referred to a non-specific
depression with no antecedents being specified (GD).
2.5 Selection of Samples
The following criteria were regarded as being important,
theoretically, in the selection of subjects for the three comparison
groups in the experiment.
1) Experimental Group.
Since the hypotheses relate to depression it was necessary
to ensure that this group was selected such that no other diagnostic
dimension was present to any significant extent. As it was necessary
to have patients with whom communication would be relatively easy and
as psychotic depressives are argued to have different pattens of
pre-morbid adjustment (Kendall 1968) an attempt was made to include
only neurotic (or reactive) depressives in this sample.
34
Anxiety has been shown to be positively correlated with
externalism (Phares 1976) so it was considered necessary to include in
the sample only depressives in whom levels of manifest anxiety were
low, as judged by the clinician in charge. However, this is perhaps a
counsel of perfection since anxiety is generally regarded as a
fundamental basis for neurotic disorders and as being their necessary
antecedent (Eysenck 1947). Other diagnostic elements which were also
excluded as far as possible were hysteria, since it has been suggested
that this reduces the effects of depression (Lazarus and Klerman 1968)
and alchoholism and drug abuse, since there is evidence that the
responses of the latter group on the Locus of Control Scale are
unreliable (Phares 1976).
It was recognised that this separation of diagnostic
categories would be at best approximate, since there is inevitably
some overlap of symptoms in most cases. Accordingly, the initial
diagnostic label used in taking this sample was "neuroticism in which
depression constitutes the major part", as appraised by the Senior
Clinical Psychologist involved, with patients being excluded if any of
the contra-indicators listed above were suspected. It was also
considered that this selection could be deemed to have worked
effectively, to the extent that the scores of this group on the Beck
Depression Inventory discriminated between this group and the two
control groups.
2) Psychiatric Control Group
Since the emphasis in the study was upon neurotic
depression, a neurotic control group was selected. The ideal
diagnostic criterion for this group would have been that the subjects
should show no evidence of depression. This, as noted above, is in
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reality not feasible, so the initial diagnostic criterion for this
group was "neuroticism in which depression is a minimal symptom", as
evaluated by the Senior Clinical Psychologist involved. The
contra-indications for this group were similar to those for the
experimental group; alchoholism, drug abuse and manifest psychotic
symptoms.
3) Non-psychiatric Control Group
The main criterion for this group was that it should not
include anyone with any evidence of current psychiatric symptoms.
Also precluded were persons suffering from continued overtly stressful
situations, since the effects of such stress are implicit in the
experiment. Care was also taken to exclude anyone who had suffered
from any form of depression or other disorder, seriously enough to




A pilot study was carried out to test the materials to be
used in the experiment and its format. The materials and the
procedure used were essentially those employed in the main
experimental procedure (qv p40). Twice as many descriptive passages
were used compared with the main experiment, with the aim of selecting
those which yielded comparable levels of perceived stress for both
control and non-control situations and which represented three
distinct levels of stress.
The subjects used in the pilot study were 8 final year
undergraduates, 3 female and 5 male, having an age range of 21 to 45.
3.1 Method
As a result of the pilot study the original set of
instructions was modified and extended to make them more explicit.
Additional prompts were found to be necessary, to cover the three
different time periods which are involved. For the first 6 subjects
an interval of approximtely 1 minute was interposed between each
presented situation, which was occupied by conversation of a relaxed
and general nature. It was realised that the situations were not
percieved by the subjects, overall, as being unbearably stressful and
that this relaxed period might actually be reducing their effects and
would thus interfere with the testing of hypothesis 4 (p21). For the
last two subjects this interval was dropped and since no adverse
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effect was observed this latter procedure was used for the main
experiment.
3.2 The materials
In order to assess the effectiveness of the descriptions of
LCU events, subjects were asked to report the feelings which they
thought they would have as a result of each event. A total of 112
responses was obtained from the subjects in this way. The most
frequent emotion reported was that of anger/annoyance (20 times) with
other emotions consistent with a stress response being shock (19)
guilt (8) worry/tension (7) and depression (2). Reports of being
happy occurred 7 times, all to one item which was subsequently dropped
from the main experiment.
Each subject produced a minimum of 2 responses overall for
each LCU item used and a maximum of 10 responses was recorded by one
subject for one situation. This confirmed that the technique is fully
capable of eliciting a range of responses which varies in number from
subject to subject and which contains the basic tactics which the
subjects would be expected to deploy in real life situations.
Subjects' ratings of the amount of depression which they
felt would result from each of the LCU events were also examined, as
were their ratings of the extent to which the person involved in the
situation had been responsible for it, using VAS's. Both of these
values acted as verification of the experimenter's selection of the
LCU event descriptions for their main parameters. These ratings
facilitated the final selection of items which gave mean rated





The mean values for rated control for these items was:
Control 3.6
Non-control 1.9
These results did suggest that the dimension of control was
being manipulated successfully through these descriptions. At the
same time, subjects' ratings of both the depressive effects of the
situations and the extent to which they would feel responsible for
such situations did vary considerably, suggesting that the VAS
technique was detecting individual differences in attributions in this
experimental paradigm.
The VAS materials which would be used to detect changes in
the subjects' mood during the main experiment were also examined in
the pilot study. The overall depression scores did not change between
the pre-experimental and the post-experimental periods for this group
of subjects, the differences observed having cancelled each other out.
However, the mean difference between pre- and post-experimental
status, regardless of direction of change was 4.7 (cm) for the total
of 5 items used at this stage. Since certain subjects did show
elevation of mood at the end of the test and others showed slight
depression of mood, it was considered that the technique would detect
such changes as occurred in the main experiment, satisfactorily.
However, the original set of 5 items was increased for the main
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Subjects were assessed at the beginning of the experiment
for the extent of current symptoms of depression and for their Locus
of Control characteristics.
Subjects were required to imagine themselves involved in 6
LCU situations and then to describe what they would do in each, during
a one to one interview with the experimenter. The situations were
graded as to the amount of stress they would produce in real life and
according to the extent to which the subject might be regarded as
having been responsible for their occurrence. A similar item was then
presented which was intended to examine responses to a period of
depressed feelings. Supplementary tests of mood, using the ¥AS
technique were completed before and after this experimental session,
to assess its affect on the current mood of the subjects.
Finally, subjects were asked to rate each of the described
situations for its depression evoking potential and for the extent to
which they would feel responsible for its occurrence.
After an interval of at least 12 months, subjects were
contacted with a request to repeat this procedure with a new set of
situations.
4.2 Materials
The Beck Depression Inventory. (BDI)
The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. (LOC)
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The Current Mood Scale. (CMS) This consisted of a series of
VAS 10cm scales, printed on separate slips of paper and presented in
randomised order to the subjects. For one of the administrations to
the subject (ie pre- or post- test) the order of the adjectival
descriptors on each slip was as follows, for the other administration
it was reversed:
Happy - not happy
Confident - not confident
Not depressed - depressed
Able to do the things I have to do - not able to do the
things I have to do
Energetic - listless
Can concentrate easily - cannot concentrate easily
Interested in other people and events - not interested in
other people and events
The instructions for these scales were given verbally and
were also repeated on the front of the first booklet of slips as they
were presented. They were as follows:
Please place a mark on each line, between the words, to
indicate your present feelings in terms of these words.
Right on the end of a line would mean that the word or phrase
at that end is very true, in the middle means that neither
word is particularly true. Make your decisions quickly
without pondering too long over them.
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The Situation (depressive effect) Scale, (SDES). This
consisted of a series of VAS's, also using 10 cm lines, each marked
with the adjectival descriptions "Not at all depressing - very
depressing". Above each of the constituent scales was a resume of the
situation which was to be rated on it.
The Situation (extent of control) Scale, (SECS). This was
exactly analogous to the above Scale except that the polarity was
"Entirely responsible - not responsible at all".
The instructions for these two scales were as follows:
Please make a mark on each scale below to show (how
depressing each situation would have been for you as you
imagined it)/(how much control you think you would have had
over the events leading up to the one in the story. In other
words, how responsible you yourself were for what happened.)
Make the marks in the same way as you did for the other
scales.
The stories. These were the descriptions of the LCU
situations, as selected from the pilot study and quoted in Appendix I.
Recording materials. All responses were recorded on tape
using a Phillips tape recorder running at 3 3/4 in. per sec.
4.3 Subjects
The three groups of subjects were selected according to the
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criteria discussed in Chapter 2.
a) Experimental group. Subjects were 12 male and 12 female
outpatients recruited from clinics in the Manchester area, having a
primary classification of "neuroticism with depression as a major
symptom". The mean duration of the symptoms was 16.4 months and their
mean age was 35.5 years.
b) Psychiatric Control group. Subjects were 12 male and 12
female out-patients recruited from the same clinics as the
experimental group, having a classification of "neuroticism with
depression as a minor symptom". They were matched as far as possible
with the experimental group with respect to age, length of duration of
primary symptoms and social class. Mean duration of symptoms was 11.4
months and their mean age was 30.2 years.
c) Non-psychiatric Control group. This consisted of 12 male
and 12 female volunteers obtained from the students, technicians and
ancilliary staff of a local Institute of Technology. They were
selected from persons who did not exhibit any symptoms of current
stress. They were matched, as far as possible, with the experimental
group, for age, and social status (as judged in the case of students
from their occupations prior to joining the course or from their
parents' or spouses' occupations). Their mean age was 32.2 years.
4.4 Procedure
Each subject was told that the experiment was an exploratory
study of people's responses to events which could occur in their lives
and which could cause stress. It was therefore emphasised that if the
subject wished to terminate the experiment at any time he was to feel
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free to do so. (Only one subject, in fact, did so.) The subject was
also warned that much of the experiment would be recorded on tape and
was assured that his tape would be erased immediately after it had
been transcribed.
The subject was first asked to complete the BDI, the LOC and
the CMS. He was then read the following standard instructions:
I am carrying out an experiment concerned with the ways in
which different people might respond to different things
which might happen to them. I will give you some examples of
things which could happen to people. In order to make it
more effective, I will ask you to imagine these events and to
imagine yourself actually involved in them. You may find
that some of them are rather unlikely and that they would not
happen to you. All the same, I would be grateful if you
would do your best and imagine getting into that situation
and what you would do in it. In order to help you to imagine
these things, I will ask you to sit facing this blank wall so
that you are not looking at me. When you have imagined the
situation, I will then ask you what happens next. I would
like you to tell me what happens in your imagination after
the event; what you would actually do, not what just anyone
or everybody would do. To make sure that we don't miss
anything out, I will first ask you what you would do
immediately after the event. Next I will ask you what you
would do the day after the event and finally what you would
do in the following weeks. There could of course be more
than one thing that you would do at each of these times, so I
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will repeat the questions a number of times.
The procedure of asking the subject to face a blank wall was
employed with the aim of reducing the number of distractions to the
subject, in his task, and also to reduce the potential artefacts which
could otherwise be created through experimenter feedback to the
subject.
The subject was next warned that the tape-recorder was being
switched on and was then read the first of the set of six stories.
After it had been verified that he had an appropriate event in mind he
was asked the following questions, in order to elicit a minimum of 3
imagined responses to the situation:
What would you do immediately after this happened: what would
you feel or say?
What would you do next?
What would you do the following day?
What would you do in the days and weeks following?
If the subject asked any questions relating to the outcomes
of the situation he was imagining, the experimenter produced an
essentially neutral reply, designed to encourage the subject to
imagine his own outcomes. These replies took the general form of:
"Tell me what you think would happen" or "I leave that to your
imagination". Where the subject appeared to be deviating from the
essential LCU situation he was gently put back onto the right track.
However, if the subject assumed that the situation would be reversed
by his own actions, without asking whether this was allowable this was
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accepted. On the whole, social input by E during the recording of
responses was limited to a non-committal "Uh-Huh" response after each
of the subject's statements, this being considered necessary to
maintain his momentum.
The remaining 5 stories were administered in the same way
with a minimal break between each. The order of presentation of the
stories was randomised between subjects such that each story occupied
each ordinal position in the sequence an equal number of times in the
presentations to each of the various sample groups. The one
constraint on this randomisation procedure was that no two
occupational items should occur consecutively. Half of the subjects
recieved set one of the stories and the other half recieved set 2.
After the sixth story had been presented to the subject, the
general depression item (GD) was presented in the same way. The
subject was then asked to complete the CMS for the second time. This
was followed by the light relief item (LAM), also using the same basic
presentation procedure.
The subject was then asked to complete the SDES and the SECS
and was finally asked a number of questions designed, he was told, "to
aid in the selection of samples". These included his age, present or
last occupation, and information on any current or past mental
disorders, including their nature, duration and treatment regimes.
4.5 Follow-up Procedure
A total of 22 subjects was re-tested at least 12 months
after the date of original testing, using exactly the same procedure
as for the original investigation, with the exception that the
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alternative list of stories was used for each subject. Also, the Item
LAM 2 was used in place of the item LAM 1 at the end of the
experiment. This avoided any chance of the subjects attempting to
recall the responses which they had made to the stories on the first
occasion of testing.
4.6 Data Analysis
The response protocols for each subject were typed out in
full from the tape recordings. An example is given in Appendix II.
A system for classifying these responses into a limited
number of categories was established from the data collected in the
pilot study and extended in the light of new information observed in
the main study. This was based upon that suggested by Rippere (1977).
Eight main categories were finally used to cover the responses
reported and these were as follows:
1) Active Problem Solving




6) Maintain Current Behaviour
7) Amend Future Behaviour
8) Helplessness
An attempt was made to reduce the problems of consensus in
classification by making the scheme comprehensive. A number of
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subcategories was established for each of the main categories and the
type of response which was to be included in each sub-category was
carefully specified. An aggregate score was also computed, which was
intended to represent the subject's overall efforts to cope with these
situations. It was termed the aggregate coping response, as opposed
to the aggregate defensive response, and was composed of the responses
categorised under the headings 1,2,6 and 7. The full classification
guide, as used, is reproduced in Appendix III. It was believed that
this precise guide should increase the reliability of the
categorisation process and reduce the intuitive component which might
otherwise be present. Such a scheme of classification is, of course,
still open to criticism but such criticism would then be aimed at the
face validity of the classifaction system rather than the ability of
the judges to use it.
In order to provide some measure of inter-rater reliability,
a second experimenter (a graduate psychologist) repeated this
categorisation process on a random sample of 10 protocols. This judge
received only minimal instruction in the use of the scheme, in order
to provide a tough test of the scheme. A concordance rate of 78.2%
was obtained, in this way, on the assignment of 605 responses to their
categories. When the responses were allocated to the aggregate
categories of coping versus defensive behaviour, the concordance rate
was increased to 90.9%, suggesting that the majority of the
differences between the raters lay in the allocation of responses to
similar categories of behaviour within the same overall area of
activity.
The first of the categories used, Active Problem Solving,
contains many of the behaviours which Coleman (1976) included in his
49
description of coping responses. The last category, Helplessness,
covers the pattern of non-responding which is to be expected of
depressives, in certain situations, according to Seligman's theory
(1974). The remaining categories cover other various forms of coping
and defensive response.
This system of classification was also considered to be
appropriate for the generalised depression (GD) item, since the same
range of responses is to be expected for that situation as to the LCU
items. However, the practice was adopted of assuming that the
depressive incident did stem from some identifiable cause, despite the
description of the event to the subject, otherwise all of the
behaviour listed might logically be regarded as belonging to category
1 (Active Problem-solving behaviour). In addition to the aggregate
coping response a further aggregate category was calculated for the
ADB item, termed Active Response, as compared with Passive Response,
and was formed from the responses listed under categories 1,3,6 and 7.
This score was intended to reflect Lewinsohn's (1974) suggestion that
it is the reduction in activity levels in depression which leads to a
reduction in response contingent positive reinforcement.
The responses to the LAM item were not analysed in this
study, since this scheme of categorisation would not be appropriate
for them and since they did not contribute to the hypotheses being
considered.
With spontaneously reported data a problem occurs regarding
responses which are not overtly reported but which may be implied by
default. Thus, if a subject does not suggest that he would change his
future behaviour, then he could be regarded as showing a "maintain
current behaviour" response by default. Since experimenter judgements
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are necessary to make such adjustments to scores and since the
emphasis here is upon the spontaneous reports of the subject, no
attempt was made in the scoring to include such implicit responses.
Another tendency is for subjects to make some of their
responses dependent upon the outcomes of their own behaviour in the
situation. This may give rise to the subject describing alternative
strategies to deal with the different outcomes which he can perceive.
Certain subjects were also found to propose alternative responses
depending on the reactions of other people in the situations. The
subjects who produce these alternative responses are, in effect,
emphasising the situational pressures on response patterns which were
identified by Rippere (1977) as "qualifiers". In this experiment all
such responses to all imagined contingencies were recorded on the
grounds that these are all part of the repertoire of behaviours which
the subject is capable of using.
Although a tally could have been made of the number of times
the subject repeated a given response in a given situation, this
information was deemed unlikely to be of much value in testing the
hypotheses, largely because such behaviour may be described both as
adaptive (if at first you don't succeed) or non-adaptive (rigidity of
thinking). Accordingly no attempt was made to examine this part of
the response pattern and each repeated response was only counted once
in the protocol, unless it clearly referred to a new aspect of the
situation or to a new person in the situation, or it referred to a
fresh initiation of the action in a subsequent time period in a way
clearly distinct from that in the earlier stage.
Since the number of responses reported would clearly vary
from subject to subject, the data recorded for analysis was the
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percentage of a subject's total number of responses to each situation
which fell into each of the 8 categories. These values could, it was
recognised, be slightly misleading where the subject produced only a
minimum of responses. They were regarded as representing the response






A check was made on the stimulus materials used in the
experiment and on the characteristics of the subject groups, to ensure
that the variables incorporated in the experimental design had been
satisfactorily controlled, using data collected in the first
experimental session.
a) The Current Mood Scale (CMS)
The total score obtained from the sum of all of the
constituent scales of the CMS correlated with scores on the BDI for
both the pre-experimental test (r = 0.85, p< 0.01) and the
post-experimental test (r = 0.82, p< 0.01).
A scale analysis was also performed on the data from the
constituent VAS's. Correlations between the separate subscales ranged
from r = 0.31 to 0.82 (median 0.56) on the pre-test scales and from
r = 0.36 to 0.82 (median 0.65) on the post-test data. Subscale to
scale total correlations ranged from r = 0.65 to 0.90 (median 0.80) on
pretest and r = 0.62 to 0.94 (median 0.76) on post-test. All of these
coefficients were statistically significant (p<0.01). On factor
analysis, using a principal component analysis, the first extracted
factor accounted for 61.8% and 57.7% of the variance in the pre- and
post- test data respectively.
These data were taken as indicating that the CMS had both
internal and external validity sufficient for it to be used as a
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measuring instrument in this experiment.
b) The Stimulus Materials
The responses to the Situation Scales (SDES and SECS) were
used to ascertain whether or not the the stimulus stories differed with
regard to the level of percieved stress which they would produce in
real life. The data used here were those obtained from the
non-psychiatric group only. Although the expected separation was not
achieved in all of the specific comparisons between items at the same
assumed level of stress, the overall means obtained (High 7.3, Med 5.9,
Low 5.1 ) do suggest an overall separation according to the likely level
of stress produced by these three treatment conditions. Since other
outcomes than depression are possible, these data would only provide an
approximate check on the levels of stress involved, so they were
regarded as giving a reasonably satisfactory confirmation of the status
of the stimulus stories.
From the subjects' ratings of percieved control in these
situations, it was evident that there was general agreement with the
experimental manipulation, with the mean ratings for C items being 5.2
and the mean ratings for NC items being 2.8.
These checks confirmed that the story items could be
regarded as defining specified levels of stress and control and that
they could thus be used in an analysis of variance model as defining
levels of variables and not simply be regarded as unique and randomly
differing stimuli.
c) Subject Variables
The characteristics of the groups of subjects are given in
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Table 1. These data Indicate that a satisfactory separation of the
experimental groups was achieved on the basis of the subjects' BDI
scores as well as on the basis of the diagnostic criteria. However, as
was expected, the variables of depression and locus of control were to
some extent confounded in the sample groups, with the BDI scores
showing a correlation with externality of control of 0.51 (p< 0.001, n
=72). This Table also gives group data regarding changes of mood
observed between pre- and post- test states and subject's ratings of
depressive effect and control in the situations.
5.2 Response data
The data obtained from the original testing of the subjects
are presented in Tables I to X. Each of these Tables is followed by a
summary of the main effects and interaction terms which were found to
be significant in the analyses of variance which were carried out.
Other non-significant effects have been omitted for the sake of
clarity. These analyses were performed using the SPSS computer
package. Differences in means for main factors which had 3 levels (ie
Psychiatric Status and Stress) were examined for significance using the
Newman-Keuls test and the Tukey test was used to examine the
interaction effects, (Keppel 1973). The main findings from these data
are summarised in the following chapter.
Table 1 Subjects' scores on scales
(n = 6 per cell )





























































































































































































BDI Beck Depression Inventory
LOC Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale
CMS Current Mood Scale (VAS)
SDES Situation (Depressive Effect) Scale
SECS Situation (Extent of Control) Scale
Ext External Subject Group
Int Internal Subject Group
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Subject Group High Stress Med Stress Low Stress X GD
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 28.62 8.93 27.28 36.22 20.77 28.33 25.03 8.12
Int 28.73 17.33 35.65 35.82 51 .22 35.17 33.98 6.78
M Ext 15.28 34.78 37.67 30.37 27.25 14.45 26.63 7.57
Int 25.73 23.25 31 .40 28.88 32.87 37.20 29.88 12.22
Psych F Ext 24.98 20.52 28.22 33.13 18.33 32.77 26.33 6.27
Control Int 8.78 17.30 15.85 21 .12 40.87 31 .05 22.50 3.85
M Ext 20.55 29.12 38.00 23.62 34.23 36.08 30.26 11 .05
Int 28.75 28.23 41 .37 27.83 38.27 41 .93 34.39 8.42
Normal E Ext 17.10 26.45 30.17 28.83 38.52 32.53 28.93 5.02
Control Int 24.17 20.08 26.35 34.50 28.65 37.35 28.52 8.66
M Ext 24.09 21 .43 31 .90 48.73 36.10 23.78 31 .00 3.97
Int 23.68 33.32 46.32 41 .88 50.60 41 .72 39.58 15.08
Overall Means (n = 36)
Externals 21 .77 23.54 32.21 33.48 29.20 27.97 28.03 7.00
Internals 23.31 23.25 32.82 31 .67 40.41 37.40 31 .47 9.17
Females 22.06 18.44 27.25 31 .60 33.06 32.87 27.55 6.45
Males 23.01 28.36 37.78 33.55 36.55 32.53 31 .96 9.72
(n= 24)
Experimental 24.59 21 .07 33.00 32.82 33.03 28.79 28.37 8.67
Psy Control 20.76 23.79 30.86 26.43 32.93 35.46 28.37 7.39
Normal Control 22.26 25.32 33.69 38.49 38.47 33.85 32.01 8.12
(n= 72)
All subjects 22.54 23.40 32.52 32.58 34.81 32.69 29.76
Stress 22. 97 32. 55 33. 75
Control 29-95 Non-Control 29.55
Summary of Anovars: Category 1 , Active Problem Solving
Stress situations
Main Effects
Sex p<0.02: Males 31.96, Females 27.55.
Stress p<0.001: High 22.97 < Medium 32.55 (p<0.01) = Low
33.75.
Interactions
Loc x Stress p<0.04).
High Stress Med Stress Low stress
Int 23.28 32.25 38.91
Ext 22.66 32.85 28.59
Externals show less Active Problem Solving in low stress







Table II Mean probabilities of Responses in category 2
Passive Problem Solving
Experimental Condition
High Stress Med Stress Low Stress GD
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 6.08 9.05 4.61 2.51
Int 15.72 8.62 4.80 14.77 10.08 8.72 10.45 3.45
M Ext 12.82 6.58 7.32 0.98 10.28 3.90 6.99 5.62
Int 9.72 19.35 9.03 4.88 9.63 10.90 10.59 14.33
Psych F Ext 7.08 2.78 15.02 2.78 11 .04 10.53 8.21 0.00
Control Int 4.68 0.00 12.28 0.00 5.17 6.08 4.70 0.00
M Ext 12.80 2.38 0.00 2.78 4.23 4.25 4.41 4.18
Int 12.20 3.02 2.75 7.93 5.93 6.38 6.37 3.27
Normal F Ext 11 .18 0.00 1 .85 15.77 9-75 9.08 7.94 5.05
Control Int 11 .88 4.42 10.02 4.60 9.43 8.13 8.08 4.58
M Ext 11 .69 13.88 0.00 3.60 10.85 12.28 8.71 2.00



























































Control 8.40 Non-control 6.83
8.60
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Summary of Anovars: Category 2, Passive Problem Solving
Stress Situations
Main Effects
Psychiatric Status p<0.04: Normals 8.77 = Experimental 8.16 >
Psychiatric Control 5.91 (p<0.05)-
Interactions: Sex x Stress (p<0.001).
High Stress Med stress Low Stress
M 11.00 4.09 8.60
F 5.53 7.87 8.60
Males show more Passive Problem Solving behaviour in high
stress situations than do females (11.00 to 5.53, p>0.01).
General Depression Item
Main Effects
Sex (p<0.025): Males 5.82, Females 2.60.
Psychiatric Status (p<0.05): Experimental 6.49,
(Normals 4.28) > Psychiatric Control 1.86 (p<0.05).
Interactions: none.
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Group High Stress Med Stress Low Stress X GD
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 0.00 12.08 2.08 0.00 4.23 8.22 4.44 14.28
Int 3.75 24.57 3.33 5.55 4.45 7.37 8.17 7.40
M Ext 0.00 10.72 1 .67 0.00 5.38 10.47 4.71 12.39
Int 0.00 19.73 4.80 2.57 4.07 3.70 5.81 15.28
Psych F Ext 9.27 14.15 1 .52 0.00 4.87 5.83 5.94 28.92
Control Int 7.03 10.07 3.93 12.35 6.28 1 .67 6.88 19.92
M Ext 5.15 6.73 0.00 4.45 7.57 3.68 4.60 8.59
Int 9.92 11 .58 6.95 3.77 1 .38 6.35 6.66 17.33
Normal F Ext 4.42 5.67 5.45 13.00 3.18 11 .60 7.22 8.12
Control Int 8.08 13.85 9.55 15.18 7.68 11 .57 11 .00 21 .90
M Ext 3.48 8.02 12.48 0.00 11 .27 5.45 6.78 17.07
Int 6.75 5.17 7.33 9.92 1 .85 2.57 5.60 16.05
Overall Means (n = 36)
Externals 3.72 9.56 3.87 2.91 6.08 7.54 5.61 14.90
Internals 5.92 14.16 5.98 8.22 4.29 5.53 7.35 16.31
Females 5.43 13.40 4.31 7.68 5.11 7.71 7.27 16.76
Males 4.21 10.33 5.54 3.45 5.25 5.37 5.69 14.45
(n = 24)
Experimental 0.94 16.78 2.97 2.03 4.53 7.44 5.78 12.39
Psych Control 7.84 10.63 3.10 5.14 5.03 4.38 6.02 18.69
Normal Control 5.68 8.18 8.70 9.53 6.00 7.80 7.64 15.79
(n = 72)
All subjects 4.82 11 .86 4.93 5.56 5.19 6.54 6.48 15.61
Stress 8. 34 5..25 5. 87
Control 4.98 Non-control 7.99
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Summary of Anovars: Category 3, Active Avoidance
Stress Situations
Main Effects
Stress (p<0.02): High 8.34 > Low 5.87 (p<0.05) = Medium 5.25.
Interactions
Loc x Stress (p<0.02)
Stress High Med Low
Internals 10.04 7.10 4.91
Externals 6.64 3.39 6.81
Internals show more Active Avoidance in high and medium stress
situations than do externals (7.10 to 3.39, p<0.05).
Psychiatric status x Stress (p<0.02).
High Med Low
Experimental 8.96 2.50 5.99
Psychiatric Control 9.24 4.12 4.71
Normal 6.93 9.12 6.90
Depressives show the least Active Avoidance in medium stress
situations whereas normals show the most Active Avoidance in









Group High Stress Med Stress Low Stress X
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 42.63 21 .65 27.98 19.05 17-27 24.35 25.48
Int 18.28 8.62 18.00 13.65 7-40 15.18 13.52
M Ext 37.87 29-70 14.03 32.72 29-22 26.50 28.34
Int 22.43 9-40 15.18 14.23 16.95 14.37 15.43
Psych F Ext 30.12 35-27 21 .88 31 .45 25.55 22.25 27.75
Control Int 34.28 32-92 32.43 23.20 11 .80 19.43 25.67
M Ext 23.68 29-93 28.77 24.17 15-80 16.07 23.07
Int 20.30 18.80 24.22 17-65 17-50 18.78 19.54
Normal F Ext 25.72 12.12 17.60 13.47 11 .25 16.62 16.13
Control Int 17.23 13.03 22.15 18.82 15-78 12.72 16.62
M Ext 28.17 13.42 20.23 19-78 8.28 19.18 18.16














Overall Means (n = 36)
Externals 31.37 23.68 21.74 23.44 17-90 20.83 23.16 41.18
Internals 21.90 15.54 20.35 16.18 12.56 15.23 16.96 32.09
Females 28.04 20.60 23.34 19-94 14.84 18.43 20.87 35.62
Males 25.22 18.62 18.76 19-68 15.61 17-64 19-26 37-65
(n = 24)
Experimental 30.30 17-34 18.80 19-91 17-71 20.10 20.67 43.58
Psych Control 26.97 29.23 26.83 24.12 17-66 19-13 23-99 33.56
















Summary of Anovars: Category 4, Passive Avoidance
Stress Situations
Main Effects
Psychiatric Status (p<0.001): Psychiatric Control 23.99 =
Experimental 20.67 > Normal 15.47 (p<0.01).
Loc (p<0.001): Externals 23.16, Internals 16.96.
Stress (p<0.005): High 23.12 = Medium 20.43 > Low 16.63
(p<0.05).
Interactions: Psychiatric Status x Loc (p<0.02).
Status Norm P Con Exptl
Int 13.80 22.61 14.48
Ext 17.15 25.41 26.91
External Depressives show more Passive Avoidance than do
Internal Depressives and largely account for the differences
between Internals and Externals at the main effect level.
Stress x Control (p<0.05).
General Depression Item
Main Effects
LOC (P<0.05): Externals 41.18, Internals 32.09*
Interactions: none.
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Group High Stress Med Stress Low Stress X GD
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 6.25 24.68 6.55 12.12 11.10 9.17 11 .64 10.97
Int 9.53 11 .65 1 .85 4.60 4.63 8.90 6.86 12.45
M Ext 8.23 11 .68 9.53 9.85 6.20 13.48 9.82 14.93
Int 6.10 1.10 7.93 9.15 11.10 7.83 7.21 7.77
Psych F Ext 9.97 5.97 14.12 12.50 20.36 3.33 11 .05 12.40
Control Int 11 .40 7.53 6.50 18.89 8.67 10.72 10.62 12.70
M Ext 12.98 6.43 5.55 11 .67 12.63 14.18 10.57 16.63
Int 8.10 9-47 4.27 9.27 11 .07 11 .77 8.99 11 .92
Normal F Ext 14.41 16.32 11 .05 13.45 18.56 10.24 14.01 8.17
Control Int 5.22 13.70 1 .58 2.60 8.93 9.05 6.85 16.40
M Ext 7.28 7.27 3.75 2.57 0.00 21 .88 7.12 5.82
Int 9.85 15.97 0.00 10.17 14.60 14.45 10.81 12.15







































Psych Control 10.62 7.35













































High Stress Med Stress Low Stress
NC NC NC
GD
Exptl F Ext 3.75 9-45
Int 13.47 14.83
M Ext 8.17 3.37
Int 18.90 17.43
Psych F Ext 8.22 8.18
Control Int 15.62 16.18
M Ext 19.02 2.78
Int 14.75 22.08
Normal F Ext 11.51 22.17
Control Int 22.03 24.10
M Ext 23.38 23.47
Int 12.08 18.27







Psych Control 14.40 12.31




























































































































Summary of Anovars: Category 6, Maintain Current Behaviour
Stress Situations
Main Effects





Psychiatric Status (p<0.05): Normals 26.86, (Psychiatric
Control 20.31) > Experimental 15.03 (p<0.05).
Interactions: Psychiatric Status x LOC (p<0.05).
Status Norm P Con Exptl
Int 20.87 23.65 20.53
Ext 32.84 16.97 9.53
External Depressives are less likely than others to conceal
depressive episode and to attempt to ignore its effects
whereas external normals are more likely to do so.
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Group High Stress Med Stress
C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Int 1 .67 0.00 1 .85 2.03
M Ext 2.10 0.00 1 .67 0.00
Int 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.55
Psych F Ext 1 .85 0.00 0.00 0.00
Control Int 4.17 0.00 0.00 1 .67
M Ext 0.00 0.00 8.10 0.00
Int 1 .38 0.00 0.93 0.00
Normal F Ext 0.00 0.00 6.15 2.08
Control Int 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33
M Ext 0.00 1 .85 1 .67 0.00
Int 2.38 0.00 6.55 1 .52
Overall Means
(n = 36)
Extenals 0.66 0.31 2.93 0.35
Internals 1 .60 0.00 1 .56 2.36
Females 1 .28 0.00 1 .33 1 .52
Males 0.98 0.31 3.15 1 .18
(n = 24)
Experimental 0.94 0.00 0.88 1 .91
Psych Control 1 .85 0.00 2.26 0.42
Normal Control 0.60 0.46 3.59 1 .73
(n = 72)
All subjects 1 .13 0.16 2.25 1 .36























































































Control 3.10 Non-control 1 .54
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Summary of Anovars: Category 7, Amend Future Behaviour
Stress Situations
Main Effects
Stress (p<0.001): Low 4.50 < Medium 1.81 (p<0.01) = High
0.65.
Control (p<0.01): Control 3.10, Non-control 1.54.
Interactions: Psychiatric Status x Control (p<0.05).
Status Norm P Con Exptl
C 3.50 4.19 1.59
NC 1.28 1.23 2.09
Normals and Psychiatric Control subjects are more likely than
Depressives to initiate new behaviour subsequent to situations









Group High Stress Med Stress Low Stress X GD
C NC C NC C NC
Exptl F Ext 18.75 23.23 2.08 0.00 8.33 3.33 9.29 1 .12
Int 8.82 14.45 3.33 1 .38 3.75 6.88 6.44 5.78
M Ext 15.58 3.22 4.52 1 .18 5.02 8.33 6.31 0.42
Int 15.45 9-73 0.00 5.83 4.17 6.28 6.91 1 .12
Psych F Ext 8.48 13.18 2.78 4.17 0.00 3.33 5.32 5.62
Control Int 13.73 16.00 1 .85 3.75 3.33 0.00 6.44 4.22
M Ext 5.78 14.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.34 1 .97
Int 4.57 6.83 0.93 0.00 0.00 1 .67 2.33 0.75
Normal F Ext 15.68 17.36 3.90 0.00 3.33 3.81 7.35 0.00
Control Int 11 .43 10.82 0.00 1 .28 0.00 0.00 3.93 1 .23
M Ext 1 .97 10.65 0.00 0.00 1 .85 4.77 3.21 0.00








































Experimental 14.65 12.66 2.48 2.10 5.32 6.21 7.24 1.85
Psych Control 8.14 15.57 1.39 1-98 0.83 1.25 4.36 3.14














Summary of Anovars: Category 8, Helplessness
Stress Situations
Main Effects
Stress (p<0.001): High 11.48 > Low 2.84 (p<0.01) = Medium
1 .70.
Psychiatric Status (p<0.02): Experimental 7.24, (Normal 4.42)
> Psychiatric Control 4.36 (p<0.05).
Sex (p<0.05): Females 6.46, Males 4.22.
Interactions: Sex x Stress (p<0.05).
Stress High Med Low
M 8.63 1.34 2.68
F 14.33 2.04 3.01
The sex effect is evident only in the high stress situations,
with females showing more Helplessness in those situations







Table IX Mean Probabilities of Aggregated Responses:
Coping Behaviour
Experimental Condition
High Stress Med Stress Low Stress x
NC NC NC
GD
Exptl F Ext 32.37 18.38
Int 59.59 40.78
M Ext 38.37 44.73
Int 54.35 60.03
Psych F Ext 42.13 31.48
Control Int 33.25 33.48
M Ext 52.37 34.28
Int 57.08 53.33
Normal F Ext 39-79 48.62
Control Int 58.08 48.60
M Ext 59.16 60.63
Int 54.02 63.34
















































































































































Control 60.32 Non-control 56.36
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Summary of Anovars: Aggregated Responses, Coping Behaviour
Stress Situations
Main Effects
LOC (p<0.001): Internals 62.24, Externals 54.43.
Psychiatric Status (p<0.01): Normals 62.78 > Exptl 57.29 >
Psychiatric Control 54.95 (p<0.01).
Sex (p<0.05): Males 61.42, Females 55.25.
Stress (p<0.001); Medium 64.67 = Low 63.75 > High 46.60
(p<0.01).
Interactions: Psychiatric Status x Sex (p<0.05).
Status Norm P Cont Exptl
M 67.07 59.76 57.45
F 58.49 50.16 57.13
The difference shown at main
is not shown by Depressives.
General Depression Item
effect between Males and Females
Main Effects
Psychiatric Status (p<0.05): Normal 40.79 > Psychiatric
Control 30.74 (p<0.05) = Experimental 30.56.
Interactions: none.
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Table X Summary of Response Probabilities by Group
Response Category
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(n = 12)
Norm Int 34.05 9.21 8.30 13.78 8.83 19.69 2.57 3.56
" Ext 29.97 8.33 7.00 17.15 10.06 19.52 2.21 5.28
Expt Int 31 .93 10.52 6.99 14.48 7.04 20.61 1 .74 6.68
" Ext 25.83 5.80 4.58 26.91 10.73 16.21 1 .95 7.80
(n = 24)
Exptl 28.37 8.16 5.78 20.67 8.90 18.40 1 .85 7.24
Psy Con 28.37 5.91 6.02 23.99 10.31 17.95 2.71 4.36
Normal 32.01 8.77 7.64 15.47 9.71 19.61 2.39 0.31
(n = 36)
Ext 28.03 6.81 5.61 23.16 10.71 17.18 2.42 1 .52
Int 31 .47 8.42 7.35 16.96 8.56 20.14 2.21 4.87
Females 27.55 7.33 7.27 20.87 10.17 18.08 2.31 6.46




The various hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1 will first be
discussed in the light of the response probability data obtained from
the 6 stress items on the original presentation. In theory, these
data refer to the early attempts by people to handle stressful
situations and therefore to stave off depression (and other disorders)
at the outset. It should reveal the pattern of skills and other
behaviours which determine whether a particular individual resists
stress successfully or is overcome by it. Secondly, the patterns of
ADB reported by the various subject groups will be examined, to see
whether or not these are consistent with previous findings and with
the hypotheses regarding the handling of stressful situations.
6.1 Hypothesis 1 (The multiple determinism of response to
stressful situations.)
a) Personality determinants.
There is relatively little statistical evidence for locus of
control acting as a main determinant of response probability for the 8
specific categories of response. The only clear main effect occurs
with regard to category 4 (Passive Avoidance) where, as expected,
externals show more passive avoidance than internals (23.16 to 16.96).
However, other trends in the main effects are also in the expected
direction: Internals show more active problem solving (31.47 to
28.03), passive problem solving (8.42 to 6.81), active avoidance (7.35
76
to 5.61) and tendency to maintain current behaviour (20.14 to 17.18),
together with less comfort seeking behaviour (8.56 to 10.71).
When these data are summarised into the global category of
coping versus defensive behaviour, locus of control shows a clear main
effect, with internals showing more coping behaviour than externals
(62.24% to 54.43%, p<0.001). These data are therefore consistent with
the idea that internals will be more likely to treat any kind of
stressful situation as an occasion on which to exercise and develop
their skills than will externals. However, it should be noted that in
all of the experimental groups the majority of the behaviour does fall
into the coping categories, the only exception being depressed
external females at 49.2% coping behaviour, reflecting the potentially
high value of the the situations involved for the individuals
participating in them. This motivational factor, as expounded in
Rotter's (1954) Social Learning theory, is necessary to convert any
expectations of control into action.
The variable of Locus of control is involved in significant
interaction effects with respect to two categories of response: An
interaction is observed with level of stress in the situation, for
active problem solving behaviour (p<0.04). Whereas internals and
externals show much the same amount of active problem solving in high
stress (23.33 to 22.66) and medium stress situations (32.26 to 32.85)
internals deploy more active problem solving towards the low stress
items than externals (38.91 to 28.59). An interaction is also present
between locus of control and level of stress with respect to active
avoidance (p<0.02). Internals show more active avoidance in
situations of high (10.04 to 6.64) and of medium stress, while
externals show more active avoidance in situations of low stress (6.81
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to 4.91). Thus externals do not show the decreasing use of active
avoidance with decreasing stress which is exhibited by the internals^
(6.64, 3.39, 6.81 to 10.04, 7.10,4.91).
The psychiatric status of the individual is associated with
different patterns of responding. Depressives use similar amounts of
passive problem solving to normals and both use more than the
psychiatric controls (8.16 to 8.77 and 5.91, p<0.05). Also, as
predicted, depressives show more of the helplessness response than
psychiatric controls who in turn show similar amounts to normals (7.29
to 4.71 and 4.42, p<0.05). Since this increased level of helplessness
responding occurs over all levels of stress, it would imply that the
depressive's ability to respond to new situations is greatly impaired,
whether these are major or minor issues, compared to that of the
normal. When overall coping behaviour is examined, depressives claim
to use less than normals but more than psychiatric controls (57.27 to
62.78 and 55.11, p<0.01).
Psychiatric status also shows an interaction effect with
level of stress where active avoidance is concerned, (p<0.02).
Depressives show more active avoidance in high stress conditions, than
normals (8.86 to 6.93) while normals show more active avoidance in the
medium (9.12 to 2.50) and low stress (6.90 to 5.99) situations.
Unfortunately, psychiatric status is confounded with the
Locus of Control of the subjects, these two variables being correlated
in this sample (r = 0.51). For example, in all of the diagnostic
groups the externals are more depressed than the internals. This may
explain why these two variables are only involved in one mutual
interaction term of significance; where passive avoidance is concerned
(p<0.02). Internal depressives show as much passive avoidance (14.5)
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as normals (15.5) and much less than psychiatric controls (24.0) but
external depressives show more passive avoidance (26.9) than any other
group. In this respect, externality of belief seems to be acting as an
amplifying variable upon depression.
b) Situational determinants
Where situational determinants are concerned in this
experiment, it is primarily the effects due to the level of stress in
the situations which emerge rather than those due to responsibility
for the event. Thus level of stress occurs as a significant main
effect in all 8 categories of response behaviour. Active problem
solving is greater in the low stress situations than in moderate
situations and high stress situations, especially, as noted above,
where internals are concerned (22.79 to 32.55 and 33.75, p< 0.001).
Where the intention to amend future behaviour is concerned,
there is more commitment to change in the low stress situations (4.50)
than in the medium (1.81) and the high stress situations (0.65,
p<0.001). These effects are consistent with a general tendency on the
part of people to be conservative where the stress is highest (cf
Coleman 1976, cited above) and being prepared to tackle minor
stressors with strategies developed by themselves. However, by
contrast, the tendency to maintain existing behaviour patterns is
higher in medium stress situations (24.35) than in low stress
situations (16.92) and high stress situations (14.72, p<0.01).
Passive avoidance is highest in the high stress situations
(23.12) and in medium (20.43) and is lowest in the low stress
situation (16.36,p<0.05), as expected. The probability of the
helplessness response is also higher in the high stress situations
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(11.48) than in the low stress (2.84) and the medium stress situations
(1.34, p<0.01). These data are consistent with it being harder for the
individual to respond to events with fresh initiatives, the more
stressful those events are percieved to be.
The variable of responsibility for the event appears as a
main effect only in the case of the intention to amend future
behaviour, with greater intention to change being declared in
situations for which the subject is responsible than for those in
which he is not (3.10 to 1.54. p<0.01). This pattern of responding
makes sense in an internal and skills-oriented world. No significant
difference was observed in this variable with respect to the
helplessness response,, suggesting that the individual could equally
well be disturbed emotionally by situations for which he was
responsible as for those for which he was not.
c) Interactions between determinants
Throughout the above passage a number of interactions
between personality variables and situational variables have been
observed. They are present in 5 out of the 8 categories of response
studied although not in the summary category of coping behaviour.
Interactions are also present between the two situational determinants
and between the three personality variables. Clearly then, there is a
complex relationship between these variables, as they apply to the
individual in any situation and the type of response which he is most
likely to produce in that situation.
However, because these interaction effects do not extend to
all of the possible cases of response type, it is reasonable to
examine the hypotheses relating to the specific main effect areas of
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the personality determinants and of the situational determinants.
6.2 Hypothesis 2 (Depression reduces the probability of
coping behaviour)
The direct way of testing this hypothesis is to consider the
correlation between the subjects' scores on the BDI and their reported
use of coping behaviour in response to the situations. For this
purpose, the scores were pooled across the 6 stressful situations.
The correlation obtained is (r = -0.39, n = 72, p<0.01). This is
consistent with increasing depression reducing the amount of coping
behaviour deployed against new situations. The parallel test is to
observe whether increasing externality of belief has the same effect.
In this case the correlation is (r = 0.30, n = 72, p<0.01). A test
for linearity showed no increase in the amount of variance accounted
for by assuming a curvilinear relationship in either of these two
relationships.
To the extent that the depressives' patterns of responding
observed in the first test, are present at the second testing in
conjunction with an improvement in psychiatric status, there will be
acceptable evidence for a predisposition towards depression which has
a response base, especially if the beliefs regarding locus of control
remain more stable. But if these patterns of responding change,
together with locus of control beliefs, then there will be no such
evidence and it would be reasonable to suppose that the depression is
primarily a function of the level of stress which the individual has
experienced recently in his life. Such evidence would also be
consistent with the notion that depression and externality were
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co-determined, as is implied in Chapter 1 .
The stability of the subjects' beliefs about themselves is
indicated by the correlations between the BDI, LOC and other tests,
between the first and second occasions of testing. On the restricted
sample of subjects seen at follow-up (n = 22), LOC scores are more
stable (r = 0.60, p<0.01) than those for BDI (r = 0.44, p<0.05). This
fits hypothesis 3 (that locus of control beliefs are stable and
causative) rather than the current hypothesis. The test-retest
correlation for BDI may be elevated to some extent in that depression
scores in the normal controls are low and therefore restricted in
terms of decreases by the "floor" effect.
It is appropriate to test this hypothesis through the
correlations between the changes in BDI and LOC scores with the
changes in reported coping behaviour as observed in the initial and
follow-up sessions, since it was expected that improvements would
occur in the patient groups and there was a possibility of change in
the normal controls. However, the correlational data are not as clear
here as might have been partly because of the relative stability in
the sample, as suggested by the BDI and LOC scores. For example, only
4 of the subjects show an increase in the BDI score and only 5 show an
increase in the LOC score.
A reduction in the extent of depression (as measured by the
BDI) is associated with an increased level of aggregate coping
behaviour but the correlation is small (-0.27) and does not approach
significance with this size of sample. The correlation between the
change in control beliefs and change in aggregate coping behaviour is
slightly higher (-0.34) but also fails to reach significance with this
size of sample. Given that the Locus of Control scores are more
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stable than the depression scores, this might be taken to suggest that
it is the beliefs regarding Locus of Control which are the more
powerful determinants of the extent of coping behaviour.
The situation is less clear where the relationship between
changes in mood or belief are related to levels of aggregated coping
or active behaviour in response the GD item. In general, the scores
for both of these response variables are elevated, in the follow-up
data, compared with those observed at initial testing, across the
whole of the group studied. This may, of course, be due to the
exhortations of the therapists treating the psychiatric groups. Thus,
while a decrease in depression is associated with an increase in
coping behaviour (-0.33, NS) it is not associated with a change in
active behaviour (0.02). Increased internality of belief, on the
other hand, is associated with a decrease both in coping behaviour
(0.35) and in activity levels (0.40). This would seem to imply that
those who became more internal would have shown less of an increase in
active responding than those who did not, when it is recalled the
subjects were more active overall at the follow-up stage.
From these data it is clear that, although there is a
reduction in coping behaviour associated with increasing depression,
because of the association between depressed mood and externality of
belief (r = 0.51 ) it is not possible to decide whether the active
determinant is the level of depression or the beliefs regarding locus
of Control.
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6.3 Hypothesis 3: (Depression is a result of External
beliefs regarding control)
The alternative possibility to that entertained in
hypothesis 2, is that external beliefs regarding control predispose
people towards depressive reactions. This hypothesis can be examined
through the profiles of the behaviours shown in response to the stress
situations. The data from which such profiles could be drawn are
presented in Table X. In theory these profiles could be used to
specify the optimum strategy for avoiding depression as a consequence
of experiencing a stressful event, if a clear difference could be
observed between the profiles of the depressives and those of the
normals. That optimal strategy would represent the most effective
balance between the various categories of responding. If externality
of belief and depression are closely related then the profile given by
normal externals would tend to be similar to that of the depressives.
This would leave the profile of the normal internal as the ideal
pattern of behaving; ie one in which there was neither over- nor
under-use of any particular category of responding.
In effect all of the group profiles are so close to each
other as not to provide clear discrimination as to pattern. They
correlate with each other at a median r of 0.97 with a range from 0.89
to 1.00. These correlations are all significant at the p<0.01 level.
Minimal support for communality between depresssion and externality of
belief comes from the fact that the correlation between the normal
internals' profile and that of the depressives is lower that most, (r
= 0.93) and that of normal externals correlates with that of the
depressives (r = 0.98). However, the correlation between the profile
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for the normal internals also correlates highly with that of the
normal externals, (r = 0.98).
There are similarities of pattern of responding between the
externals and the depressives insofar as the directions of the
differences between the proportions of each category of response given
by the depressives and normals are the same as those appearing between
externals and internals. The differences observed are both
significant in the case of category 4 and trends are observable in the
cases of categories 1,2,3,6,8 and the aggregate coping behaviour.
The hypothesis can also be tested by examining the
relative abilities of the BDI and LOC scores to predict future and
past levels of coping behaviour. In this respect, the initial BDI
score predicts current coping behaviour reasonably well at the time of
initial testing (-0.39, n = 72, p<0.01) but not so well at the
follow-up testing (-0.29, n = 22, NS). The follow-up BDI score
similarly predicts coping behaviour at the time of testing, (-0.43, n
= 22, p<0.05) but not at the time of initial testing (-0.14). On the
other hand, although LOC scores at the time of initial testing predict
the coping score then, (-0.30, n = 72, p<0.01) they are less effective
predictors at the time of subsequent testing (-0.26, n = 22, NS), than
they should be if they are stable and have a causative relationship
with coping behaviour. Similarly, although the LOC score at the
follow up, does predict coping behaviour then (-0.54, n = 22, p<0.01)
it does not do so at the initial time of testing (0.05, n = 22, NS).
Since the BDI and LOC scores are correlated, as noted above,
it is appropriate to consider their combined effects upon coping
behaviour using multiple regression analysis on the data from the 72
subjects at first testing. This shows that adding the LOC variable to
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an equation which already incorporates the BDI scores leads to an
increase of less than 2% in the amount of variance accounted for,
implying an almost total overlap between the two dimensions.
There is thus relatively little evidence for the locus of
control beliefs being a primary cause of the onset of depression. The
alternative hypothesis is that of the dual causation of depression and
externality of belief. For this hypothesis to hold, any change in one
should be accompanied by a similar change in the other. Since the
change in the BDI scores correlate only minimally (albeit in the
expected direction) with the change in LOC scores (r = 0.22, NS) ,
there is also little support here for this hypothesis either.
6.4 Hypothesis 4 (Stressful events will have a greater
depressant effect on externals than on internals.)
Neither of the alternative hypotheses recieves support in
this part of the study since the changes shown by subjects between the
pre- and the post-tests of mood are sufficiently random to cancel out;
neither locus of control nor psychiatric status demonstrate any
effect. Overall, there is a slight improvement in affect across the
sample and the (non-significant) correlation between BDI scores and
changes in affect between the pre- and post test stages is -0.01 .
This may be due to the fact that for some depressed subjects this
imaginal attempt to resolve problems, in an atmosphere which does not
criticise their suggestions could lead to an improvement in morale.
This is consistent with the helplessness inoculation hypotheses put
foward by Seligman (1976). On the other hand being made to face
unpleasant situations may weaken other subjects' beliefs in their
ability to control their world, or they may experience depressing
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associations, evoked by the descriptions of events, reminding them of
unpleasant past experiences of a similar nature. Indeed, from Table
1, it can be seen that the largest increase in depressed feelings is
recorded by the internal, female control group (0.50).
6.5 Hypothesis 5 (Depressives show a restricted range of
adaptive behaviour)
There is some evidence to suggest that the range of
behaviours demonstrated by depressives, in response to these
situations, is more restricted than that of the normal controls.
Thus, if the number of categories of behaviour (1 to 8) used by the
subjects in the total number of 7 situations is computed, the mean is
29-9 (max 56) for normals and 27.0 for depressives. with psychiatric
controls showing even less (26.4) (p<0.04). This slight difference is
consistent with depressives having a narrower range of behaviours from
which to obtain positive reinforcement, or of being relatively more
rigid in their use of those behaviours which they do have in their
repertoire. This might particularly be the case with the external
female depressives who report the narrowest range of all (23.3). As
might be expected, internals report a slightly wider range of
behaviours 29.0 to 26.6 (p<0.01), consistent with their using a full
range of skills in all situations of stress.
6.6 Hypothesis 6 (There are sex differences in styles of
response to stressful events.)
Sex differences could be regarded as another source of
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individual differences in responding and any effects which are present
would clearly add to the personological factors discussed under
hypothesis 1. Normally, its effects may be expected to be confounded
slightly with those of locus of control and of depression, since women
are normally more external than men and more prone to depression.
However, this effect may be moderated in this sample as a whole since
the women in it are neither much more depressed (14.23 to 13.45) or
much more external (11.78 to 11.11) than the men.
Males show more active problem solving than females (31.96
to 27.55, p<0.02). Males also show a trend towards less active
avoidance (5.69 to 1.21, p<0.09)) and less of the helplessness
response (4.48 to 6.46, p<0.03) than females.
In terms of the aggregated coping responses, males tend to
show more coping behaviour than females (61.52 to 55.25, p<0.05) but
there is an interaction involved here, with psychiatric status
(p<0.05). Normal males use more coping behaviour than normal females
(67.07 to 58.49); a similar effect is shown in the Psychiatric Control
group, (males 59.76, females 50.16) but in the depressed group there
is no difference (57.46 to 57.09). These data could be regarded as
being consistent with sex-role stereotypes of the male as being the
one who fixes things and the female as being the one who gets others
to fix things for her.
An interaction is observed between sex and stress with
regard to passive problem solving (p<0.001) Both sexes show the same
amount of passive problem solving in the low stress situations (8.60
to 8.60) but men show more in the high stress situations (11.00 to
5.53) and women show more in the moderate stress situations ( 7.87 to
4.09). An interaction is also shown between sex and level of stress in
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the situation with respect to the helplessness response (p<0.05).
Whereas females tend to show more of the helplessness response across
all situations, this effect is more marked in the high stress
situations (14.33 to 8.63) than in the medium (2.04 to 1.34) and the
low stress (3.01 to 2.68) situations. It is possible that this effect
is due to a particular schedule of social training for women, which
generates part of their stock of knowledge as to what to do in
difficult situations. However, logically this effect should also be
associated with higher levels of passive problem solving, (that is
getting others to handle the situation for one) which, as noted above,
does not occur consistently. It should also be associated with a sex
difference in comfort seeking, which, although evident in the data, is
not statistically significant.
6.7 Hypothesis 7 (External attributions of responsibility
form a part of the defence mechanism against stress.)
This proposition can partly be tested by analysing the
extent to which depressives firstly deny control in the situations to
which they are exposed and secondly whether any such reduction in
control is associated with lower subjective feelings of depression
caused by the situations.
Information to test this proposition is provided by Anovars
of the scores on the SECS and SDES (Table 1 p 55). Depressives do not
differ from the two control groups in the extent to which they assume
responsibility for the events described. But they do tend to regard
those events as being more depressing than do the normal controls
(depressives 6.50, Psychiatric control 6.21 and Normal Control 5.79
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(p<0.05). These differences are in the expected direction, since
depressives have been shown to attend preferentially to the negative
aspects of their environments (Lloyd and Lishman 1975). This pattern
is also shown by tue externals; they do not differ from internals in
their attributions of responsibility, contrary to expectation, but do
find the events more depressing than internals do (6.37 to 5.96,
p<0.05).
It is possible that the failure to find differences between
the groups in terms of the amount of responsibility tuat the subjects
would assign to the events is due to the way in which the descriptions
of the events were composed; if they were seen as being wholly
unambiguous, the ratings may well have been limited in their range as
a consequence.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that those events for
whicu tne individual has responsibility are percieved as being more
depressing, since the correlation between the overall ratings for
these two variables is r = 0.24 (n = 72, p<0.05). However, when the
correlations between ratings for individual events are computed, for
the three psychiatric status groups separately, differences do emerge.
Depressives produce the highest corrrelation between attribution of
responsibility and of depressive effect, (r = 0.25, n(scores) = 144,
p<0.01) with normals yielding the next highest, (r = 0.19, n(scores) =
144,p<0.05) and psychiatric controls the lowest, (r = 0.07,n(scores) =
144, NS).
These data are consistent with the proposition that in
depression the defence mechanism of denial of responsibility has
broken do..n. Perhaps that breakdown leads to the state of events in
which there is a tendency to reduce coping responses in the face of
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events described as being of the persons own responsibility, (the
correlation between SECS and coping behaviour is -0.20, n = 72,
p>0.10, NS) and in those situations which are regarded as depressing
(the correlation between SDES and coping behaviour is r = -0.22, n =
72, p<0.10, NS).
6,8 Anti-depressive Behaviour
In general, these subjects show similar patterns of response
to feeling depressed to those deployed against stressful situations.
However, fewer of the effects, as assessed by the Anovar, are
statistically significant. Significant main effects are observed with
respect to passive problem solving for the variables of sex (males
5.82 to females 2.60, p<0.025) and psychiatric status (depressives
6.49, Normal Control 4.28, to Psychiatric Control 1.86, reversing the
effect found with respect to the response to stressful events,
p<0.05); passive avoidance for LOC (externals 41.18 to internals
32.09, p<0.05); maintaining current behaviour for psychiatric status
(Normal controls 28.86, Psychiatric controls 20.31, to Depressives
15.03, p<0.05). In this case, psychiatric status also shows an
interaction with LOC (p<0.05) with externals showing greater
variations than internals; whereas the internal depressives,
Psychiatric Controls and normal Controls show roughly similar amounts
of persistence of behaviour, 20.53, 23.65 and 20.87, respectively,
externals show less persistence in the psychiatric groups; depressives
9.53, Psychiatric control 16.97 compared with normals 32.84..
Non-significant differences in the expected direction, that is to say
similar to those observed in the response to the stress items, were
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observed only in category 7 with respect to psychiatric status;
categories 1 , 2, 3 and 6, with respect to LOC; and categories 1, 3,
5, 7 and 8 with respect to sex.
The aggregate category of coping behaviour also does not
show any significant effects on Anovar. The nearest trend is that
observed in LOC (Internals 36.98 to Externals 31.08, p<0.08). The
other aggregate category, that of active (as opposed to passive)
behaviour, does show a main effect due to psychiatric status (p<0.05),
upon Anovar. Normals (51.4%) show more active behaviour than
psychiatric controls (47.6, p<0.05) and both show more active
behaviour than depressives (36.5, p<0.01).
Only one of the sex differences in ADB examined in this
experiment is statistically significant; that of passive problem
solving behaviour (Males 5.82, Females 2.60, p<0.025). However, in
terms of non-significant numerical differences, males show- more
active problem solving behaviour (9-72 to 6.45), passive avoidance
(37.65 to 35.62), intention to amend future behaviour (0.79 to 0.68)
and overall (aggregated) coping behaviour (35.39 to 32.65). Males
also show less active avoidance 14.45 to 16.76), less comfort seeking
(11.54 to 12.18), tendency to persist with current behaviour (18.52 to
22.94) and helplessness response (0.71 to 3.00).
Consistent with these very weak differences in the ADB
patterns of males and females is a lack of difference in the number of
categories of ADB employed by the subjects. Overall, males do report
a slightly wider range of ADB (4.25 to 4.00) but this does not emerge




7.1 Limitations to the conclusions
It is very likely that some of the anomalies in the data
in this study concerning the main effect of psychiatric status are
caused by the ambiguous nature of the psychiatric control group which
was used. Although such a group is usually considered to be a
necessary experimental prerequisite, its composition is often not
exactly specified. The group used here contained, amongst others, a
number of people diagnosed as suffering from anxiety state,
agoraphobia, personality problems, etc. Hence the values obtained for
the various response probabilities must be treated with care, since
inevitably, the behavioural patterns of any group depend upon its
precise composition. Where the composition of a control group is
precisely specified, then it represents another experimental
parameter, one which allows the behaviour of another specific
diagnostic group to be examined. Only then can it give rise to
precise and testable predictions.
It is possible to regard depression as being one stage in a
process, which starts with some kind of unpleasant event, or failure
to achieve a particular source of reward, proceeds through the stage
of the person making considerable efforts to overcome his problem
(effort stress) to a stage in which uncertainty about the
possibilities of success becomes manifest as anxiety and finally comes
to the point at which ultimate failure leads to withdrawal, apathy and
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depression (cf Klinger 1975).
If this model is assumed, then the control group used here
would necessarily have contained individuals at different stages in
this process of the development of depression. It would not be
possible to assume that their patterns of behaviour were sufficiently
distinct from those of the depressives to form a wholly satisfactory
basis for statistical comparisons.
Amongst the three sample groups used here, considered in
terms of this process model, the normals responding to the LCU stress
items might be regarded as having been in the first, effort stage of
the process. The experimental group should have contained
predominantly those whose personality characteristics, or experience
of stress had caused them to withdraw to some extent from their
problems. But the psychiatric control group would have been likely to
have contained a mixture of people who were experiencing each of the
three stages. Those who were in the second, anxiety stage, might hve
been expected to demonstrate either the effort stress stage, or some
component of partial withdrawal from the situation. Therefore the
total score for the group, for any particular response probability,
will depend on the chance distribution of these three types of
adaptation within the group. Hence, for the purposes of this study,
anomalies in the performance of the control group can largely be
discounted. However, this control group does provide evidence that
persons suffering from these kinds of neurotic disorders do show
different patterns of responding to those shown by normals.
It may be remarked that a number of workers using the
original technique to induce learned helplessness failed to find
evidence of depression in people subjected to it. Instead their
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subjects tended to report the occurrence of anger, feelings of
frustration, etc (eg. Gatchel et al 1975). These findings are of
course consistent with this process model of depression. The
difference between those inductions and the technique used here is
that after he had reported the actions which he felt he would take,
the subject was allowed to draw his own conclusions regarding the
outcome of his actions. In some cases he will have assumed that they
were at least moderately successful. Thus, in the case of the events
in which there were arguments with other people, the outcome of the
event was often described as "It would all be forgotten", that is to
say, the blockage would be removed and would have no further effect
upon the individual.
In the stress events stage of this experiment, subjects
were, in effect, exposed to removable blockages between themselves and
sources of reinforcement. There was little evidence of overt
hostility and anger on the part of the subjects, when they were
presented with the items, possibly because of the relationship which
had been built up with the experimenter. However, in their reports of
their reactions to the events, the subjects frequently reported that
they would experience feelings of anger, frustration and hostility
towards those involved. Presumably, being able to convince themselves
that they would cope with the events led to the dissipation of these
feelings at least as far as they might have occurred within the
experimental situation. A possible extension of the experimental
technique, which was not pursued in the current study, would have been
to assess the extent to which the subjects believed that their actions
would lead to positive results. In this context, it would be predicted
that beliefs in positive results of their actions would be associated
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with a positive change in subjects' mood, as measured on the CMS,
between the pre- and post-experimental testings for mood.
Another weakness in this experiment comes from the
difficulty of specifying the amount of stress which is experienced by
people in the different situations. In particular, many feelings of
frustration and unhappiness were ascribed to the situations, nominally
of low stress, in which the person's holiday plans were upset
(6C,6NC). It may be that these reactions were to the stress caused by
the unpredictable withdrawal of an expected positive reinforcement.
This sudden withdrawal may have caused these events to appear
subjectively to be more stressful than more predictable, and
inherently more threatening, events in work and in everyday life.
This might then have led to a sharper change in behaviour than would
otherwise be predicted by the general level of stress assigned to the
item under the original Holmes et al (1967) evaluation of the LCU
event.
These arguments do suggest that the analyses of variance
could have been repeated using the subjects' own ratings of the
stress-inducing capacities of the events to specify the main
variables. This was not felt to be wholly justifiable since the
subjects ratings, although adequate for the purposes for which they
have been used above, might not be sufficiently accurate, in terms of
parity of ranges between subjects, to specify such variables. However,
it would be an exercise very much in keeping with the
person-environment fit models of stress propounded by workers such as
Van Harrison (1978).
Within these limitations, it is now possible to set out some
conclusions which may be drawn from the study as a whole.
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7.2 Parallels with Rippere's studies
Rippere (1976) reported that certain ADB strategies were
used which her respondents found were not successful in relieving
depression. In this study it is evident that a large proportion of
behaviour directed towards the stressful situations, by normal
subjects, falls into the category of avoidance or defensive behaviour
(37.22%), although not as much as is reported by the two psychiatric
groups. The same is also true with regard to the normals' reported
selection of ADB in the event of depression itself with 31 .79% falling
into these two categories. It may therefore be reasonably implied
that these behaviours do not necessarily fail, but form part of an
integrated repertoire of responding, many components of which will be
deployed towards a stressful event. It is perhaps the balance between
the coping and the avoiding behaviour and the sequence in which the
various stategies are applied which is crucial to success rather than
the specific items which are in the repertoire. Only where the
position of the behaviour in the sequence of responding to an incident
is specified, together with the goal of that behaviour, in terms of
whether it is intended to provide temporary relief or long term
resolution of a problem, can its effectiveness be assessed.
The subjects in this experiment were not asked to evaluate
the effectiveness of their behaviour, since attempts to do so would
have distorted the results. Instead, a non-committal support was
supplied for all responses, by the experimenter during the interview.
It is therefore not possible to supply a direct assessment of the
differences in effectiveness of their behaviour experienced by the
various sample groups. Nevertheless, some subjects did supply some
97
self-evaluation by implying at the end of a sequence of responses that
their problem would be solved by their own behaviour. Thus S25,
having described his responses to event 2C, said, "I think I would
come out on top...with things working my way".
On this basis we may conclude that much of the behaviour
reported by subjects was regarded as correct. In that respect, the
implicit bias caused by Rippere's (1976) instructions to subjects may
not have been totally overcome. But what did emerge, in addition to
what might otherwise have been prompted by her question "what is the
thing to do?", was the set of strategies which the subject was likely
to deploy against the residual tensions of the situations, and which
would have the effect of alleviating stress. Also elicited were the
responses which were regarded as being inevitable by the subjects
insofar as they assumed that their personalities allowed of no other
behaviour, even though it might not have been right.
It was suggested in the introduction, as an extension of
Rippere's findings, that because of their beliefs internals should
prefer, or otherwise regard as more correct, active and skill-based
activities. To the extent that they did show more active problem
solving behaviour and more aggregated coping responses than externals
this is supported. Thus, although there was no difference in their
overall range of behaviours directed at stressful events and at
depression, there were differences in the type of behaviour which they
deploy.
Rippere (1977) found that depressives reported a slightly
wider range of available ADB than normal controls, but one which was
less successful. In this study, there is no evidence regarding
differences in total range of activities reported but it is clear that
9'8
the depressives used a narrower range of categories of behaviour than
did the normals, for the stress situations. That restriction is, of
course, confining them in everyday life, relatively speaking, towards
the defensive strategies, whilst by comparison normals will be using
coping patterns more freely. When, on the other hand, the response to
the depression item is examined, there is no evidence for depressives
using a narrower range of categories of ADB than normals.
7.3 Causes of Depression
The straightforward interactionist approach to depression
obtains only modest support from this study, insofar as significant
interactions were observed between the personality component, Locus of
Control, and the main situational variable, level of stress, in just
two out of the eight categories of response (active problem solving
and active avoidance) and not in the results for the aggregated
response category of coping behaviour. This may perhaps be because
externality of belief and depression are co-determined (as will be
discussed below) thus rendering the former an inappropriate variable
with which to investigate such interactions. In the absence of a
clear pre-eminence of the interaction terms, it is reasonable to
examine the hypotheses concerning the situational variables and the
personological variables in their own right.
It was observed in Chapter 1 that externality of belief and
depression have been induced experimentally, using very similar
techniques (Phares 1962, Seligman 1974). There is thus a difficulty
in distinguishing between the two phenomena both logically and
experimentally. In this study it can be seen that over a period
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ranging between 24 and 60 months, the subjects' LOC scores were more
stable than those on the BDI (test-retest r = 0.60 for LOC, r = 0.44
for BDI). However, in the regression equations calculated in order to
predict coping behaviour at the time of the initial examination, BDI
scores accounted for more variance than LOC, and the latter added no
significant amount to the proportion of variance accounted for. Also
the LOC scores on the first occasion of testing only correlated with
the BDI scores on the follow-up to an insignificant extent (r = 0.28,
n = 22, NS) whereas the BDI and LOC scores at follow-up did correlate
more substantially (r = 0.43, n = 22, p<0.05). Evidently, externality
covaries with depression but does not predict it in the relatively
distant future.
It seems likely, therefore, that the external beliefs may
be induced in the subject by those events which also precipitate his
depressed feelings, rather than the externality of belief being a
fully independent pre-disposing factor. In other words, both
phenomena may emerge together from the depression-inducing process
suggested by Klinger (1975) and cited above.
It would therefore seem reasonable to regard externality of
belief as a component of depression. This would agree with Abramson
et al's (1978) reformulation of Seligman's theory of learned
helplessness, in which it is absorbed as part of one of the three
attributional factors affecting the extent of depression. This is
also consistent with Beck's 1976) theory of depression in that certain
of the aspects of the external belief system, such as the belief in an
unjust world, an unpredictable world and a world run by powerful
others (cf Collins 1974), would clearly constititute negative thoughts
when they are believed by an individual regarding his environment.
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Locus of Control theory also encounters some problems with
regard to the difference between attributing responsibility for an
event to oneself and believing that one has the skills and ability to
cope with it. These two aspects of the belief system are not
separated by the LOC scale as presently constituted. It may be for
this reason that there was no difference between internals and
externals in the extent to which they attributed responsibility to
themselvesfor the events to which they were responding. Indeed, the
numerical difference observed was in the opposite direction, implying
that externals assumed more responsibility for the events than did
internals. This was particularly so in the case of the depressed male
external subjects. It may be suggested that if depression is partly
caused by a breakdown in the ability to use the defence mechanism of
denying responsibility for events, then such external beliefs as exist
independent of the level of depression could act as an amplifier,
making the mood yet more depressed.
There is a little more support in this study for the
hypotheses concerning situational determinants of depression. Thus
the greater the stress involved in the situation, the more the level
of coping behaviour was decreased. Also, it was evident from the
discussions with some of the depressed subjects that they had suffered
major problems in the period preceding the depression, such as loss
of, or threat to, the health of a close relative; change of, or threat
of, loss of a job; severe financial difficulties; etc. (A more
detailed survey of this aspect was not possible, since the case
records were not made available to E.) Thus, the situations placed
before these subjects by E could be regarded as having added
substantially to the total level of stress which they were already
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experiencing. Presuming that time distances the individual from the
effects of such trauma (which are occasions of withdrawal of sources
of positive reinforcement) then recovery should be associated with an
increase in coping behaviour and this was indeed the case.
Where such trauma are concerned, it is interesting to
speculate on the role of the shock response, which was tabulated in
these analyses under the heading of Helplessness responses. This was
reported by both normal and depressed subjects. It is exemplifed by S
38 (Appendix 3) who responded to the car accident item with "I would
fall apart...become totally withdrawn." Such a response, to any
event, clearly prevents the individual from carrying out any positive
action himself and may therefore lead him into further difficulties.
Even though this pattern of response has few positive aspects to it a
number of subjects reported this kind of reaction, as being a fixed
part of their personalities.
It may be speculated whether this is some malfunction of
the individual's biological fight or flight system, which leads to him
freezing into immobility. It is an effect infrequently reported as
part of the physiological response pattern of the human being to
threat. On the other hand, it may be a natural consequence of having
a highly labile or "weak" autonomic nervous system as is argued by
Eysenck in his theory of neuroticism (1947). A further alternative is
that this is a learned response, acquired through classical
conditioning or through social learning processes. If this is the
case than it would seem to be something which is incorporated in
beliefs about female patterns of adaptation, for the helplessness
response was highest in the females in this sample, and was often
associated with a tendency to rely upon someone else to sort out the
1 02
problem.
However, this line of argument also assumes that the
situation interacts with the individual's nature to produce an effect.
A great problem is that of the exact nature of this interactive
process. One possibility is that the interactions have a cyclical
nature, with the agents taking the role of cause and effect
alternately. At any point in time, an individual who is feeling
moderately depressed may, according to these data, be expected to be
more likely to indulge in avoidance or defensive behaviour which will
not improve the chances of his attaining long-term goals thus causing
him to fail to obtain satisfactory levels of reward out of any event
which he has to handle. If he chooses to interpret this failure as
being due to personal factors, such as his innate ability or
personality, or any other factors which are both stable and generalise
over the majority of his activities in life, he may well feel loss of
self-esteem and a further depression of mood as predicted by Abramson
et al (1978) in their reformulation of Seligman's theory. The mood so
caused will in turn become the cause of further reductions in coping
behaviour in the face of new challenges. Each stage will therefore
act by exacerbating the next. Such interactions are not available for
statistical inspection in the interaction terms obtained from analyses
of variance.
One may describe these alterations in mood as being due to a
reduction in response contingent positive reinforcement, as is
suggested by Lewinsohn, in his (197A) theory of depression. But one
may equally describe the lack of behavioural output as being due to
negative cognitions, such as are proposed by Beck (1976). In terms of
locus of control those cognitions will incorporate beliefs about lack
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of control, lowered expectancies of success, etc. They may also
suggest to the individual that the problem which he now faces is
insurmountable, in which case, psychologically, he will be facing the
kind of unyielding environment which is the centre of Seligman's
orginal theory of learned helplessness. Only if it is regarded as
necessary that one of these cognitive, affective or behavioural steps
should be the primary one, do all these theories clash. But if each
is regarded as constituting one part of the same cyclical process, the
theories cohere satisfactorily. Each factor may be regarded as having
its part to play in the condition of anxiety, although they ma,, not
always occur synchronously. In particular, all three of these
components help to explain how the individual comes to make the
blockages which he meets in his life so apparently insurmountable.
Similarly, whereas this study may conclude that external
beliefs are co-determined with depressed affect and therefore do not
differ from depressed affect, which is a properly parsimonious
interpretation of the data, a cyclical interdependent relationship may
equally well be possible between externality and depressed mood.
Thus, perceptions of lack of control may produce depressed, apathetic
feelings which in turn create further feelings of lack of ability to
control events. Such a process would be cognitively self-accelerated
and would not have to depend on any reduction in externally available
or presented reinforcements. It gains support from the finding in




The experimenter certainly gained the impression that this
type of interview technique encouraged subjects to participate fully
and easily and that it did tap their true response patterns. A number
of subjects overtly commented that what they were suggesting was the
obvious thing to do, clearly believing that what they would do was the
normal and natural thing to do, oblivious of the fact that others
would report quite different responses with equal confidence. Some
also volunteered the information that they were describing past
patterns of behaviour; S52 responding to item 1NC said, "I've had
similar situations happen and those were the reactions I had."
It would therefore seem to be a useful measuring technique
for examining people's repertoires of skills more or less directly in
preparation for later skills training exercises. It would also
provide the basis for discussions with clients concerning the
effectiveness with which they go about their everyday lives. This
would relate not simply to the process of dealing with stressful life
events, part of the process of what is now termed stress-inocculaton
training (eg Meichenbaum 1976), but also to managing the state of
feeling depressed itself. There would appear to be effective
strategies for handling depression which may be abstracted from these
patterns. But it is also important, in setting up any remedial regime
to ascertain what the individual feels is the natural thing to do, if
only to anticipate the bad habits he may relapse back into when the
experiencing difficulties in applying the skills taught during
therapy.
However, a caveat must be entered. It is clear that certain
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of these items produced responses which were directly related to class
differences, especially with regard to assumptions about the extent to
which people in different work situations control the outcomes. Thus
a frequent response of working class subjects to job situations such
as 5NC and 3NC was to make statements similar to those made by S33, in
response to event 5C: "If someone is your superior, you just have to
sort of fall in with what they tell you to do." Others, from the
middle class, tended to assume that they had some responsibility in
the issue and could even work to reverse the situation. Clearly,
behaviour which is adaptive in middle class situations is unlikely to
have quite the same effect in working class milieux.
The advantage of this technique would be that it allows the
therapist to indicate to the client how his patterns of behaviour may
be ineffective in areas outside those which he sees as containing his
current problems. In particular it picks up the tendency on the part
of the individual to overgeneralise in his behaviour and his
interpretations of the world around him and to indulge in behaviour
which itself induces a downward spiral. The record of S38, responding
to item 5NC, (Appendix 3) provides a good example of the development
of a sequence of negativistic behaviour. From the end of his
responses to the first question (what would you do immediately?) this
subject describes a sequence of behaviour in which, through
bitterness, he withdraws voluntary aspects of his services from the
work situation, in a punitive fashion, thus minimising the chances of
his obtaining future positive reinforcement from his supervisor. "My
work would not be to the same standard, neither would I work as fast,
and I would not bring work home...Anything which I regard as work over
and above the call of duty would not get done. I would be far less
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inclined to help out ray employer, when he found that he needed help."
This investigative routine would also allow the damage which
has been caused to the individual's otherwise normal strategies by an
excessive amount of recent stress, to be made evident to him. It
would also allow the therapist to ask the client how he would
personally feel if people behaved in those ways towards him, one of






I want you to think of the person who is closest to you in
your own family but not your wife/husband or son or daughter.
(If there is no-one who fits this, then your best friend.) I
want you to imagine that you have been out together somewhere
for the evening, with some friends, and that you are now
returning home by car. You are driving the car; it is dark
and wet and late. Suddenly the car skids on the wet road and
crashes. You are hurt but your passenger is killed.
1 NC
1 want you to think of the person who is closest to you in
your own family but not your wife/husband or son or daughter.
(If there is no-one who fits this, then your best friend.) I
want you to imagine that one day you return home to be told
that that person has been knocked down by a car while
crossing the road and has been killed.
2 C
I want you to imagine that you have a good job which pays
well and which you like doing. One day you are asked to see
the boss who tells you that he has found your work
unsatisfactory and that you are dismissed.
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2 NC
I want you to imagine that you have a good job which pays
well and which you like doing. One day you arrive at work to
find that the boss of the place has been dismissed for
embezzling the funds and everyone is out of work as there is
no money to keep the place going.
3 C
I want you to imagine that you are running your own small
business which is essentially providing a steady income. You
decide on an ambitious project which you believe will bring
in a considerable extra gain. This project fails to work out
successfully and you are forced to change to a much less
ambitious project in order to avoid financial ruin.
3 NC
I want you to imagine that you are working for a firm or an
organisation and that you really believe that what they are
doing is important and valuable. You are engaged in some
particular work which your boss has described as being
particularly important. You have been working on this for
quite some time. One day he calls you in to explain that he
has been told that this project is no longer to be carried
out and that you are to do something else instead. In
effect, months of your work are down the drain.
4 C
I want you to imagine that you are discussing with your girl
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friend/ boy friend/ husband/ wife, some particular purchase
which you have just made and that the matter develops into
what may be described as a typical row. At the end of it all
one of you abruptly leaves the room or even the house.
4 NC
I want you to imagine that you are discussing with your girl
friend/ boy friend/ husband/ wife, some particular purchase
which he/ she has just made and that the matter develops into
what may be described as a typical row. At the end of it all
one of you abruptly leaves the room or even the house.
5 C
I want you to imagine that you are working at a job in which
you are very much involved. One day, while your immediate
superior (your boss, foreman, supervisor or whatever) is
away, an important problem arises which you use your
initiative to solve. When he or she returns your superior
finds out what you have done and tells you that you have
acted quite wrongly. Whatever you say makes absolutely no
difference at all. So you are having a row about it in which
he or she just won't listen. At the end of this, he or she
tells you in no uncertain terms how you should act in the
future.
5 NC
I want you to imagine that you are working at a job in which
you are very much involved. One day you arrive at work
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slightly later than usual due to a traffic jam caused by a
road accident. You find that your immediate superior (your
boss, foreman, supervisor or whatever) is waiting to discuss
something important with you. He or she is very angry at
your lateness and whatever you say makes absolutely no
difference at all. So you are having an argument or a row
about it in which he or she just won't listen. At the end of
it all he or she tells you not to be late again or there will
be serious consequences.
6 C
I want you to imagine that you have booked to go away on a
holiday abroad and that you have been looking forward to this
holiday for the past few months. When you arrive at your
destination you find that the hotel which you picked out of
the brochure has not been completed and you are put instead
into a much poorer one.
6 NC
I want you to imagine that you have booked to go away on a
holiday abroad and that you have been looking forward to this
holiday for the past few months. When you arrive at the
airport to leave, you find that the holiday firm, a very well
established one, has collapsed suddenly overnight and that
your holiday is cancelled. Also, there is no way in which you
can get your money back at that particular point in time.
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GD
I want you to imagine a day when, for no apparent reason, you
just feel downright depressed and miserable.
LAM C
I want you to imagine that you meet someone who tells you a
few good tips on how to succeed on the stock market. You act
on his or her advice, perhaps they stake you, and you work
out some moves of your own. All-in-all you are very
successful and at the end of a period of time you find that
you have made £250,000, if you cash it all in.
LAM NC
Do you do the Football Pools? Well I want you to imagine
that one day (purely by chance) you decide to do the Pools
and for once you are entirely successful and you win
dividends to the value of £250,000.
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APPENDIX II
Protocol from Subject number 38.
6C (Spoilt Holiday)
(Q1) Be very angry. I'd be faced with the choice of ruining
the holiday by stirring up trouble or whatever one wants to call it.
Or by making the best of a bad situation and a lot would depend on
what the new facilities would be able to provide and what we were
looking forward to out of our holiday. The standard of hotel, as far
as I would be concerned, wouldn't be so important as the facilities
that were available for us to use our time in the way we wanted to use
our time. I would still experience anger that I had been, be it
willingly or unwillingly, deceived but I would give notice that I
would want a refund in part, or whatever, the money we'd paid for the
holiday but would sort that out or attempt to sort that out when I
came back rather than during the holiday. Later I'd have a drink of
ale or whatever the local alcoholic beverage is, make sure my wife had
the same, in an attempt to unwind the tense feelings and emotions and
attempt to get both of us in a positive frame of mind for enjoying the
rest of the holiday as best we could.
(Q2) Again that would depend on the area of the hotel.
If the hotel offered similar facilities to those I was expecting, in
terms of ease of getting to swimming water or sunbathing or what have
you, then the effect of the lower standards would be minimal. If
those facilities were not what I wanted then I would get increasingly
irate. And on the assumption that there is somebody to contact I
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would attempt to get them to find us a place that would satisfy our
requirements for the holiday.
Q3) There would reach a point in time when it would
become fruitless or pointless to agitate assuming that the holiday was
still a disaster so then one would attempt to make the best of the
situation we had. Depending on the experience of the whole fortnight
one would actively pursue redress from the company I had booked the
holiday from, if necessary through a solicitor. Depending on the
results of the exercise, deciding not to use a particular travel agent
or tour operator again. Also recommend to others to take our
experiences into account when they consider their holidays in the
future.
2C (Loss of Job)
(Q1) Again I would feel anger, frustration, coupled with a
certain amount of despair. I would go along to the local Job Centre
and put my name down as an individual seeking employment. Have a look
at the jobs available, to see if anything interested me. Make sure I
got an evening paper and actively looked for a job through the paper.
(Q2) I'd have a lie in bed because there would be nothing
else I could do. That would be a way of achieving something positive.
Because I'm one of the people who always likes to stop in bed in the
morning. Would realise that we would have financial problems. Tell
the Building Society what the situation was and what facilities if any
they could offer us. Or what we could expect from them if money dried
up and similarly phone the Bank.
(Q3) I'd find a job somehow and initially it wouldn't
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really matter what, so long as it paid more than I would get on Social
Security and then it would be attempting to hold the job down while
continually attempting to find a better one until such time as I found
that our financial needs and personal needs were satisfied.
4 NC (Argument with Spouse)
(Q1) Fume. And it would be my wife that had left the
room. There would be nothing I could do about the purchase because it
had already been made. And if my wife had made the purchase she would
have regarded it as essential anyway and I would find myself in a
normal situation of not being able to finance what are regarded as
essential requisites which I would then find depressing. It would end
where there would be no communication between us and my wife would go
to bed at the normal time and I would stop up. I'd end up listening
to music until about 2 o'clock in the morning to calm me down at which
point I would go to bed.
(Q2) I would become totally withdrawn because I am bearing
in mind that the purchase which has been made would be a major draw on
finances. I would review the family budget to see what could be cut
out to pay for it. And if there was nothing then attempt to get a
bank loan to cover it and if that wasn't forthcoming I would have to
put it on a credit card facility.
(Q3) Gradually over the following weeks I would become less
withdrawn and more myself, accepting the new state of parlous finance
and attempt to solve it in the best way I could. I would feel a strong
urge to go and spend a similar amount of money myself on something
that I wanted but would live with the situation in an imaginary world
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and attempt to prevent myself from compounding the problem until the
emotional state wore itself out.
5 NC (Argument at Work)
(Q1 ) I wouldn't do anything. I would feel extremely angry,
frustrated and annoyed. I would say nothing at all on the grounds
that whatever I say would make the situation worse. And control my
emotions as best as I could. And if I found that I wasn't able to
control them I would ask to be excused until such time as I could get
a grip on my emotional stability, which would be a matter of 10
minutes or so. I would feel upset that my superior was not able to
take account of my devotion to duty, for want of better expression,
and that the reason for the lateness was entirely genuine. The
realisation that my devotion to duty was not taken account of would
make me less inclined to be as devoted in the future.
(Q2) I've got my family to think of; I would make sure that
I got to work on time. It would make me bitter and I would find
myself finding a grudge against my superior. My work would not be to
the same standard, neither would I work as fast and I would not bring
work home.
(Q3) I would organise my work routine to fit in with the
time and disciplines that my superiors wanted. Anything which I
regard as work over and above the call of duty, would not get done. I
would be far less inclined to help out my employer, when he found that
he needed help.
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1 C (Death of a Relative)
(Q1) I would fall apart. I would regard myself as
responsible for the death and would be extremely self critical and
would be desolate that there was no way that I could rectify the
mistake. I would become totally withdrawn and would not listen to
reason. I would just become more and more withdrawn.
(Q2) Total depression, sorrow. Find myself remembering all
the common memories that we had together, which would tend to increase
the depression and eventually I would therefore tend to block off from
it and stabilise my own emotional state.
(Q3) I would visit the grave once. Basically to say that I
was sorry. I would have a cry and then I would block off because
there would be nothing else I could do.
3 C Failure of a Work Project
(Q1) It would depend on the reasons for the failure and how
much investment had gone up the spout. I'd be cheesed off, which
would affect my performance on the smaller project which, would make
that less liable to success, therefore I'd have to sort myself out
pretty quickly. Again I would have to put the ambitious project
behind. Before doing that I would have to analyse the reasons for the
failure and on the assumption that one is doing it in conjunction with
a bank loan, make sure that the Bank held the same view that I have
and eventually arrive at a commonly agreed reason why the project was
a failure and then make sure that those reasons were not inherent in
the running of the smaller project, rather the opposite.
(Q2) I would feel a certain amount of shame that I could
have got myself into a situation which I shouldn't have got into. I
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think I'd take my wife out for a meal.
(Q3) Week to week review the state of the new project and
see whether it was growing or growing smaller. If it were growing I
would become increasingly more self-confident and less easily
controllable in terms of ambition. If it became smaller or wasn't
going as well as it should, consider that shutting down the whole
project to avoid another failure, sooner rather than later.
GD (General Depression)
(Q1 ) If I was at work I would go to work and carry on in
the normal way, doing the best that I could accepting /what/. I would
do the best I could with the situation that I found myself in and
leave it at that and move onto the next item. If I was not at work I
would attempt to get out of the house. Or if I could have a game of
squash, I would have a game of squash or go for a walk or/ if that
wasn't possible I would listen to music that I found pleasant and
soothing and attempt to raise the level of mood in that way. Have a
decent breakfast. I would tend to drink a lot of tea or coffee, I
would feel an urge to whip down to the pub and have a pint of beer but
I would attempt to stop myself because it's, in the short term, an
easy way out and, in the long term its expensive and soul-destroying.
But if my mood did not shake out by the evening time then I probably
would go down and have a pint or two pints.
(Q2) That would depend on the success or otherwise of the
previous day. I would continue to try and elevate my mood status and
at the same time prevent anything that happened that particular day
from affecting my mood by, if I'm at home, the only thing that can
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happen that makes me depressed is the spending of money. So I would
make sure that I had the cheque book, credit cards, and make sure
there's no money spent. If I was at work, I would end up going to the
pub at dinner time and having a pint or two of beer and and the meal.
And while I was out, cultivating a Sod'em all attitude which I would
be able to maintain until the end of the day.
(Q3) Making sure to the best of my ability that life
wouldn't get me down, or minimising the downs aspects of life and
attempting to highlight the up aspects of life. In other words,
continual attempt to maintain my mood level at the highest point I
could.
LAM (Large Amount of Money Won)
(Q1) I wouldn't say anything until I realised the 250000,
in cash, in my bank account. So that's what I would do I would cash
it. I would then pay all my debts off, except the mortgage, I would
leave that standing. Then I would go out and have a pint, all on my
own, in the quietest pub I could find and just think how I feel with
not having any financial worries. I would feel elated. I would
believe myself to be in an imaginary situation rather than a real
situation and in all honesty I would be at a complete loss as to what
to do, for the first few hours. Going on a holiday to (place) in the
best hotel in the town for a fortnight, with my wife and the children.
Assuming its not a run down hotel when I get there! And I would find
old habits dying very hard; I would find myself still attempting not
to spend money and I would find it a very strange situation and I
would still feel as if I was wrong in believing that my bank account
held so much money.
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(Q2) There would come a point in time when the realisation
sunk in that the money was there. At which point in time I think I'd
give my wife 5,000 and myself 5,000 and just let us fritter it away.
(Q3) I would want to use the money effectively, and in a
worthwhile manner. I would attempt not to change my working life or
home life in any major way but the money in the bank account, assuming
that nobody else was aware that I had that much would take all of the
pressure out of life and would enable me to enjoy life and see life in
a far better or far more different context instead of looking at it
through dark-coloured glasses, they would be rosy coloured glasses. I
would become far more relaxed, far more easy to live with far more
easy to work with. I wouldn't need to consume alchohol for relaxation
or shall we say, to use alchohol to control or /not suppress/ calm the
emotions down. It would be a case of enjoying the social atmosphere




1) Active Problem Solving
a) Seek information- from friends, superiors,
professionals, books, etc. Check, or double check to ensure that the
situation is as it appears to be. Discuss the matter with others.
Seek advice from others.
b) Attempt to Reverse Situation - Attempt to get others to
return to the conditions obtaining before the incident. Undo the
cause of the situation, forgive, make restitution, apologise, make
excuses for past behaviour. Attempt to make others understand one's
point of view, attempt to make compromises with others. Seek
restitution or compensation; complain to this end.
c) Get to grips with the Problem - actively plan, organise
and carry out an adaptive strategy for resolving the problem, derived
from the subject's own thinking. Think it over in an attempt to work
out causes of the situation and what can be done about them. Review
all aspects of the situation afterwards. Briefly and actively assess
the current position (as opposed to dwelling on it for a long time).
Reflect on the situation as an academic problem.
d) Leave the Area of the Problem - leave the situation in
order to get the same or similar rewards elsewhere as would have been
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obtained from the original source before the incident.
e) Get something out of it - irrespective of the outcome
with regard to one's original aims, extract some gain, or "learn from
it".
f) Keep Control - of emotions and temper. Take steps to
lower the tension, sleep on it, let things calm down, etc.
g) Planned Precautions - mention of steps taken before the
situation occurs to prevent or reduce problems. First aid kit,
emergency numbers to ring, fire extinguishers, holiday insurance, etc.
2) Passive Problem Solving
a) Participate in Ritual - take part in a relevant social
ritual, funeral, etc.
b) Use Formal Channels - seek solution or retribution
through official or legal channels, Office of Fair Trading,
solicitors, ABTA, Police, doctor, Samaritans, British Embassy,
Citizen's Advice Bureau.
c) Rationalise - report event as "not important", "not my
fault", pass the buck, make excuses to self for past behaviour,
justify accepting the situation as it stands, deny that things could
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be otherwise, put it "down to bad luck". Feel that things could have
been worse. Expect that others will come to terms with the situation
in time.
d) Accept Outcome Without Considering it Further - put it
down to "experience", see it as a "lesson", be "philosophical about
it".
e) Rely on Others - expect or get someone to resolve the
problem for one, lean heavily on others, assume that others will do it
without being asked.
f) Debase oneself - plead, humble oneself to regain the
status quo.
3) Active Avoidance
a) Sport - participate in any sport, take physical exercise,
go for a walk, etc.
b) Find a Scapegoat - take it out on someone else, make
someone else suffer, score off others.
c) Unrelated Activity - engage in work, etc. which is
essentially unrelated to the problem area; mow lawn, do housework, go
shopping, dress up, go for a drive in the car, play musical
instrument.
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d) Leave Situation - leave the stress situation without
gaining any rewards from it. Erase traces of people and things
involved in the incident. Make contingency plans for opting out.
e) Help Others - where this will not improve or reverse the
position of the subject in the incident. Give comfort to others.
4) Passive Avoidance
a) Avoid others - passively remain away from others, sulk,
hide, etc.
b) Spectate - watch sports, watch television, cinema, listen
to radio, records, etc.
c) Consumption - eat, drink (either stimulants or alchohol),
smoke, smoke marijuana, etc.
d) Take Drugs - proscribed, prescribed or proprietary.
e) Fantasise - have relevant fantasies in which things come
out right, irrelevant fantasies about things other than the immediate
problem.
f) Inactivity - have a sit down, go to bed, be apathetic,
"do nothing", take a bath, make excuses for not doing anything.
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g) Ruminate - feel upset, regret, guilt, disappointment,
self-pity, depressed, grief, resentment, rejected, annoyance. Mope or
fume. Blame self, worry. Think of suicide. Dwell on the past, on
what might have been. Bear grudge.
5) Comfort Seeking
a) Seek Comfort from Others - solicit sympathy, inform
others, complain to non-involved others.
b) Emotional Outburst - cry, swear, throw things, slam
doors. Be irritable, angry, have a row, cause a scene, moan, "harp on
about it", be "sensitive". Laugh at it.
c) Go to Church - say a prayer.
6) Maintain Current Behaviour
a) Conceal Problem - stress, depression, etc. from others
completely.
b) Ignore Effects - pretend that there is no problem. Claim
that it will cure itself. "Will forget it in time." Act as if nothing
is happening, carry on as usual, snap out of it, pull self together,
"Not let it bother me", try to forget it.
c) No Change in Behaviour - will not alter current or
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future behaviour as a result of the incident, will not back down or
give in.
d) Accept Situation as it Stands - get on with whatever has
to be done next, "wallow in it", give it up as a bad job, "sign on the
dole", etc.
e) Start all over Again - without looking at causes of past
failures, lessons learned, etc.
7) Amend Future Behaviour
a) State Intention to Change - would avoid situation in
future, do things differently, not make the same mistake. Be a better
person.
8) Helplessness Response
a) Useless to Respond - Feel that one is up against a brick
wall, that it is a waste of time to try anything.
b) Lack of Response - "don't know" (in the absence of a
clear positive response). "I'm hopeless", feel helpless, lack the
confidence to take any action at all, feel a failure, feel totally
lost, "wouldn't be much I could do about it".
c) Panic - freeze, faint, have "hysterics", feel panic,
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